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1. Background 
This literature review was commissioned by Project “G3 - Water Governance and 
Community-based Management”, one of several projects funded by the Challenge 
Programme on Water and Food (CPWF) in the Ganges Basin. The project seeks to 
understand the different modes and outcomes of water governance in selected polders and 
the role that communities play in such governance. Governance structures at this local level 
are challenged by high rates of poverty, dense human populations, highly variable fresh 
water availability, all coalescing into intense competition for water and land resources by a 
range of users. Facilitating efficient, productive, equitable and sustainable access to these 
resources thus needs to be a key orientation of these governance systems. This review of 
past experiences and the current status of Water Management Organizations (WMOs) in 
Bangladesh are intended to contribute to the context and process of understanding the 
different governance mechanisms that are in place to manage these conflicts and their 
comparative advantages and disadvantages. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
The contents of this report are drawn exclusively from the literature sourced through inter-
library searches, the use of Google Scholar and Google web-based search engines and 
access to specific project documents from donor agencies. 
 
At the outset, the intention was to consider WMOs not merely as water infrastructure 
management entities whereby performance criteria may be somewhat limited to issues of 
operation and maintenance (O&M) functions, but within the broader lens of rural 
development which call for rational water management and allocation mechanisms. In view 
of the inextricable links between water and other resources such as land, and the multiple 
inputs required for productive water use (e.g. technologies, finance, skills) that span a range 
of sectors and actors, a key interest in approaching this review was to what extent and how 
WMOs have meshed their functions with this broader development paradigm of poverty 
reduction espoused in government policies (examples) and undertakings such as the 
Millennium Development Goals at the international level. 
 
The degree to which the above objective has been achieved in this review however has 
been limited by the relatively conventional approach to assessing WMO performance in 
much of the literature that was available for this review. Much of the literature is absorbed 
with the traditional issues of participation in project design implementation and especially 
operation and maintenance of water infrastructure. Assessments of the implementing 
agencies and descriptions of the various forms taken by WMOs are also abundant, as are 
project-specific studies that provide useful case-studies for this review. Information and 
analysis becomes scarce on the overall impacts of WMOs on the management of water as a 
multi-user resource and its impacts on local poverty indices. The only exception is the 
recognition of the traditional fisheries system as a key casualty of the government’s overall 
pre-occupation on flood control and agricultural expansion. Furthermore, while literature on 
the water sector policy, legal and institutional frameworks recognize the movement towards 
a more integrated water management approach, there is little discussion of how WMOs 
have or have not contributed to a truly integrated decision making mechanism, or how they 
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can be used to do so in the future. Another gap to emerge is that attempts to understand 
the drivers underpinning experiences with WMOs give significant attention to the 
institutional characteristics of the state agencies responsible for WMO formation, but far 
less on the influence of the beneficiaries’ own characteristics, and the influence of 
heterogeneity within and between different water user groups. Assessment of this aspect is 
limited to recognition of elite capture of WMO functioning and its links with local 
government agencies and the function of land ownership in determining access to water. 
While this review does not claim to be comprehensive, the perception of this limited 
analysis in the existing literature appear to be supported by others such as Chowdhury and 
Rasul (2011) who observe that “despite increasing emphasis on incorporating social justice, 
there has been no systematic study on how social and environmental aspects are being 
incorporated in water management projects in Bangladesh”. 
 
Overall therefore, this review does not provide much information on WMOs within the 
broader developmental context as was initially anticipated. The content instead consists of 
tracing the evolution of WMOs; detailing the various forms WMOs have assumed; 
summarizing the key policy, legal and institutional frameworks in the water sector; using 
several case studies (selected based on availability of information) to extract a deeper 
understanding of WMO workings and results in terms of participation, O&M performance 
and to a limited extent poverty reduction, and identifying key features and lessons that may 
be relevant to the project’s future activities. It is also proposed that the gaps in knowledge 
that appear to exist especially with respect to WMOs’ broader developmental role could 
provide some direction to the project’s research activities. 
 
 
3. Introduction  
As stated by DFID (2000), the water resource management system in the floodplains of 
Bangladesh at its simplest can be analyzed as one whereby choices are made or forced upon 
stakeholders relating to obtaining an adequate supply of water throughout the year, 
obtaining water-based products, such as crops and fish, and ensuring access to water for 
other livelihood activities. This situation results from a paradox in terms of availability of 
water which falls between the extremes of flood during the monsoon and scarcity during 
the dry season. Several drivers of scarcity have emerged over time to include human 
population growth, poverty and the promotion of agricultural intensification as a poverty 
reducing strategy leading to a rapid increase in water use for irrigation. In the post-monsoon 
period, soil-moisture content declines rapidly and the deficit needs to be compensated by 
irrigation (Choudhury 2005).  Saline water intrusion in the south western region further 
exacerbates fresh-water scarcity, as does the emergence of shrimp cultivation as a major 
competitor to agriculture in the south western coastal polders. This has been largely 
associated with the increase in water and land salinity alongside the loss of biodiversity of 
that region (Alamgir 2010). Within this context of increased variable supply of and increased 
demand for water, water management and distribution issues have become crucial.  
 
These same coastal areas have also to contend with severe flooding given the prominence 
of huge river flows, strong tidal and wind actions and tropical cyclones and their associated 
storm surges. Bangladesh’s topography is formed by three of the largest river systems in the 
world. Moreover, approximately 93% of the surface water of the river systems comes from 
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outside the country (Chowdhury 2010), thereby further inhibiting the country’s ability to 
manage river flows and water quality at a basin scale. Bangladesh shares 54 rivers with India 
and another 3 with Myanmar, and has to drain water from an area twelve times its size 
(Gupta et al. 2005). At other times, an ever-increasing upstream withdrawal of water from 
these rivers beyond the Bangladesh border is depriving Bangladesh of its traditional uses of 
water and causing stresses in water management within Bangladesh, particularly in the dry 
season (Choudhury 2005). Like flood management, the phenomenon of drought also brings 
into focus the inherent discord among different uses of water (Choudhury 2005).  
 
This dichotomy of extreme flooding and scarcity has triggered investments in as many as 
800 water infrastructure projects (ranging from less than 1000 ha to more than 15,000 ha) 
for flood control, drainage and/or irrigation over the past 65 years (Chowdhury and Rasul 
2011). Part of these investments has been self-induced as the construction of the polders 
and embankments resulted in a massive anthropogenic impact to the natural water 
ecosystem in Bangladesh. The polder/enclosure systems began in 1961 when the 
government recognized the need for protection of the coastal areas. It intensified from 1964 
with the Water Master Plan, prepared by the East Pakistan Water and Power Development 
Authority (EPWAPDA) with assistance from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), focused on increasing agriculture production mainly through 
extensive flood control embankments combined with structures to facilitate drainage in the 
short run and public-financed medium- to large-scale irrigation in the longer run. This plan 
was prepared for a nation of fewer than 60 million people of whom more than 90% lived in 
rural areas producing mainly rain-fed rice with relatively rudimentary technologies. The plan 
did not reflect input from local stakeholders, since sustainability and related operation and 
maintenance issues were not addressed, nor did it consider inter-sectoral problems since 
the flood plain was extensive, fish were abundant, the road network was limited, and there 
were virtually no water-polluting industries. Also, the priority was to increase rice 
production. The plan was therefore highly prescriptive and focused on restricting flood 
waters to prescribed avenues through a clearly defined system of embankments designed to 
prevent flooding of agriculture lands and ignored the effects of drought on the production 
system. This approach was firmly embraced by most engineers within EPWAPDA and by its 
successor, the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) (World Bank 2005). 
 
While the primary purpose of empolderment was to increase agricultural production by 
providing protection against tidal floods, salinity intrusion and sedimentation, the physical 
structures delinked the wetlands from the rivers and caused drainage problems and water 
logging (Islam 2005). Due to the embankments constructed on both sides of the rivers the 
natural process of tidal inundation was halted resulting in water logging and drainage 
congestion. Large sedimentation and drainage problems in the river beds caused some 
rivers in the region to die. All these modifications increased people’s vulnerability to 
environmental disasters, and the bias towards agriculture at the expense of water for other 
uses, such as in fisheries, navigation industries, forestry, domestic water requirements and 
sanitation, livestock, poultry, horticulture, and other human and environmental services 
have also undermined the diversity of natural capital available for many traditional 
livelihoods. In addition, there is an accumulation of salt in the topsoil through capillary 
action causing increased soil salinity in the polders during the dry season (Alamgir 2010). 
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Water management projects in Bangladesh focused on maximizing economic benefits and 
are generally biased towards construction of infrastructure to control water for flood 
control and irrigation. Most of the projects were intended for creating a favorable 
environment for agricultural growth. As Chowdhury and Rasul (2011) appreciate, many of 
these infrastructure interventions aimed at flood control and irrigation for agriculture have 
been poorly planned with limited inputs from local people, and often ignoring the other 
uses of water, particularly those on which the subsistence of poor people are based (GoB, 
2004, Chowdhury and Rasul 2011). While this approach has begun to change through the 
adoption of the Water Policy in 1999 and the Guidelines for Participatory Water 
Management (GPWM) in 1994 (revised in 2000), and the evolution of WMOs as will be 
discussed in this review, the conditions and constraints alluded to above broadly provide the 
physical and human contexts in which WMOs in their modern sense emerged and have 
since evolved. 
 
 
4. Evolution of Water Management Organizations in Bangladesh 
Choudhury (2005) notes that community participation in water management is not new to 
the people of Bangladesh. Historically, people especially in the tidal flood plains of the south 
and haors (depressions) in the northeast of the country built small earthen dykes around 
their paddy fields or along riverbanks under the leadership of Zamindars (landlords). At that 
time, water management was confined to protecting land from monsoon and tidal floods by 
small dykes and limited irrigation with indigenous methods. Over time, the socio-economic 
scenario changed dramatically leading eventually to the growth of large scale state public 
investments in the shape of massive coastal polders and large irrigation projects.  
 
Modern WMOs in Bangladesh may be divided into two broad types: those adopting or 
adapting the Comilla model and those following other concepts. WMOs in the first category 
vastly outnumber those in the other category due to the government policy to expand 
irrigation coverage quickly through highly subsidized public sector programs during the 
initial years of the green revolution. The Bangladesh Agriculture Development Corporation 
(BADC) and the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) spearheaded this movement 
respectively for groundwater and surface water irrigation. Comilla type WMO were the 
principal institutional mechanism through which the expansion program was implemented 
(GOB 2006). 
 
The Camilla model emerged from research conducted by the Comilla Academy for Rural 
Development, developed in early 1960s a model of cooperative that sought to resolve these 
problems. This model continues to provide the basic conceptual and structural framework 
for organizing farmers’ groups. These WMOs registered under the cooperative laws are not 
the exact replicas of the Comilla cooperatives but represent slightly modified versions (GOB 
2006). 
 
The Comilla Model  
The principal aim of this model is to bind farmers together into a functional unit, 
providing not only credit but also services to make the credit functional. Four 
fundamental features: 
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1. Organization: A two-tier cooperative system was introduced bypassing the 
traditional cooperatives. Farmers must organize themselves by forming the 
primary cooperatives, called Krishak Samabaya Samity (KSS) at the village level. 
These are then, over time, federated into a Thana Central Cooperative Association 
(TCCA) for credit support and supervision. The TCCA is the core of the Comilla 
Cooperatives’ institutional framework. Its functions are the supply and supervision 
of credit and other inputs. Each TCCA is based at the TTDC and has jurisdiction 
over all the primary societies within the remit of the thana. The TCCA is run by a 
managing committee, chiefly consisting of elected representatives of the 
federating KSS. In addition, there are a few government officials who become ex-
officio members. 
2. Access to credit: It was recognized that if the production function in agriculture 
were to be raised through the introduction of new technologies, then new inputs 
will be needed and the farmer is in no position to afford them without having 
access to significant amounts of credit. 
3. Access to other Inputs: Provision of credit was not considered sufficient for higher 
agricultural production. Farmers needed other inputs, such as fertilizer, seeds, 
pesticides and pumps for irrigation if they were to implement the new 
technologies. It was thought that initially subsidies would be required to induce 
farmers to use the new inputs but that the supports could be removed once their 
value in increasing production became obvious and their use widespread. 
4. Training: As against the practice of bringing an outside ‘change agent’, the 
concept of the model farmer was introduced for creating such agents from within 
the community. There were also tailor-made courses for training the manager, 
accountant, pump driver and other officials connected with the TCCAs. 
For more details see: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 2006. 
Institutional Studies for Legal Framework of Water Management Organizations Final 
Report. Second Small Scale Water Resources Development Sector Project. 
 
In practice however, the rapid replication of the Comilla cooperatives in the 1970s 
throughout Bangladesh under the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) effectively 
undermined each of the central features of the Comilla model. The fundamental obstacle to 
the institutionalization of the Comilla cooperatives lay in the contradictions involved in the 
requirements of a slow and cautious evolution of a new institution and the anxiety of a 
hard-pressed national government to increase productivity in quick time (GoB 2006). 
 
The next phase of evolution began in the early 1980s when the Government and donor 
community recognized the need for mobilization and promotion of beneficiary participation 
in water management to realize the potential benefits of investment in water resources 
projects through sustainable operation and maintenance (ADB 2003b). It was surmised that 
the supplementary use of minor irrigation in combination with effective flood control and 
drainage would enable farmers to crop high-yielding varieties and reduce the risk of crop 
failure from flooding or drought at the beginning and the end of the monsoon season. O&M 
of water resource schemes was also usually a problem, and it was hoped that active 
participation of local governments and beneficiaries in the development of small-scale 
water control schemes would help overcome this burden (ADB 2007). 
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Various forms of beneficiary participation models have been experimented with. Success of 
the models for enhancing participatory water management, however, was limited and 
results could not be sustained and replicated (ADB 2003b). A key reason was the 
centralized, technical paradigm these models reflected (Chadwick et al. 1998), where 
participation was merely to expedite project implementation. Participation was generally 
marginal and frequently "added on" to projects, and where it was included, the formulation 
of these activities was extremely weak. They were also compounded by the fact that only 
farmers, and not all stakeholders, were involved in the process so that vital issues were 
excluded from the system and had these participatory processes worked, they would 
generally have widened, not lessened, local inequalities. Consequently, at a workshop on 
“People’s Participation in the Water Sector: Lessons Learned from Experience” in 1997, the 
participants agreed that there had been no real participation in water sector activities in 
Bangladesh (Chadwick and Datta 2003). In many, if not most cases, establishment of water 
institutions were being agency-administered, highly directed, target oriented and deadline 
driven to form a predetermined hierarchy of Water Users' Organizations (WUOs) with a 
predetermined institutional structure, composition, tasks, and modus operandi (Quassem 
2001). 
 
Nevertheless, with hindsight these early forays in institutionalizing stakeholder participation 
in water sector programs can be seen as experiments in a learning process. While these 
initiatives are not viewed as successes in themselves, they did generate a momentum for 
further developing the institutional structures and implementing processes.  For instance, 
the second conference of the Flood Action Plan in 1992 produced a set of guidelines for 
participation in management of projects. Although the Systems Rehabilitation Project (SRP) 
of BWDB started in 1992 was largely unsuccessful (Soussan et al., 1997), it too espoused the 
idea of people's participation, and participatory elements were included after a review in 
1994 by the World Bank. This involved formation of WUOs, although these WUOs have been 
criticized as not being representative enough given that most of the WUOs consisted only of 
farmers rather than all water users (Hussain 2004).  
 
A significant development in the 1990s was the emergence at the international stage of the 
idea of peoples' participation in the management of development projects as a strategy for 
poverty alleviation. This thinking was crystalized in the water sector by the 1992 Dublin 
Principles of water management which stated that "water development and management 
should be participatory, involving users, planners and policy makers at all levels". These 
developments influenced the transition of participation merely as a means of project 
implementation and to induce the beneficiaries to either fully or partly share the cost of 
operation of schemes that are beneficial to them. The emergence of participation as a core 
theme in development activities, in tandem with the concept of integrated water resources 
management (IWRM) brought to the forefront the complexity and diversity of interests 
among water resources stakeholders in Bangladesh, and the need for cross-sectoral 
perspectives and stakeholder consultation in water management interventions.  
 
In 1994, the Government formulated the ‘Guidelines of Peoples Participation’ although they 
were applicable to water resources projects of BWDB only. Another limitation was that 
these guidelines mainly focused on irrigation projects and not flood control projects despite 
the critical nature of flood control and drainage aspects in Bangladesh. Consequently, new 
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Guidelines for Participatory Water Management (GPWM) were formulated in 2000 taking 
into consideration past experience, and applicable in all flood control, drainage and 
irrigation projects of the country. However, a World Bank (2005) assessment noted that 
while the Guidelines for Participatory Water Management constitute an excellent starting 
point for promoting local stakeholder involvement in water management infrastructure, 
they fall short of promoting meaningful participation. Rather than establishing mechanisms 
to improve agencies’ ability to respond to local stakeholders, the guidelines approach the 
participation issue from the perspective of devising mechanisms and procedures to 
encourage local stakeholders to participate in achieving the objectives of the executing 
agency.  
 
By this time, and in response to the mixed impacts of flood control infrastructure, the 
Bangladesh National Water Policy (NWP) of 1999 had already promoted a significant shift 
away from past practice with its goal of ensuring “progress towards fulfilling national goals 
of economic development, poverty alleviation, food security, public health and safety, a 
decent standard of living for the people and protection of the natural environment’. It 
emphasized the establishment of stakeholders' participation for ensuring direct input from 
people and their fruitful participation at all levels of the water resources development and 
management through establishing water users institutions (Quassem 2001). The NWP, for 
the first time, recognized the role of water in poverty alleviation and called for inclusive 
water management, taking into consideration the national goal of poverty alleviation, along 
with other goals. The Policy recognized that the “ultimate success and effectiveness of 
public water resources management projects depends on the people's acceptance and 
ownership of each project”. The Policy further requires that the “interests of low-income 
water users, and that of women, are adequately protected in water resource management”, 
and states that an “enabling environment will be created for women to play a key role in 
local community organizations for management of water resources” (Nahar 2002). 
 
Furthermore, under the policy, agricultural land everywhere is to be adapted to the existing 
flood regime. The National Water Management Plan has interpreted this to mean that no 
new flood control is to be introduced in rural areas, and that the emphasis now is on 
improving the performance and management of existing schemes. That is, within existing 
flood control schemes, different interventions are to be considered where required on a 
case-by-case basis and these interventions are to be driven by stakeholder wishes and their 
willingness to contribute to costs (World Bank 2005). 
 
To facilitate the implementation of the NWP, the government approved a 25-year National 
Water Management Plan (NWMP) in 2004. The main elements of the NWMP, among others, 
include the multi-use approach to water (not just flood protection but also irrigation, 
drinking water and other uses) and an emphasis on 'soft' approaches instead of just hard 
engineering solutions. The NWP declares clearly the intention of the Government to pursue 
a policy of IWRM, and also envisages major institutional reform including the 
decentralization and transfer of water resources management schemes to the private sector 
and civil society. It states that the “principle that community resources should be managed 
by the community concerned, along with local government institutions unless a greater 
national interest prevails, should guide water resource management.” 
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These represent key policy departures in the way water has been viewed and managed in 
Bangladesh. The NWP was a significant landmark that reflected a major shift in the 
approach to water resources management. In particular, the dominance of floods as the 
issue and infrastructure as the solution is challenged by the new policy that prioritizes a 
range of issues and recognizes the importance of, in particular, institutional change 
(Chadwick and Datta 2003). To ensure better O&M, NWP provides for handing over selected 
water management functions to stakeholders. Ultimately, the NWP envisages transfer of 
ownership of the small schemes (those below 1,000 ha) to local government and 
management to Water Management Associations (WMAs); transfer of management of 
schemes between 1,000 ha and 5,000 ha to WMAs, with ownership remaining with BWDB. 
Finally transfer of management of schemes over 5,000 ha to a joint team consisting of 
WMAs and Local Government with ownership remaining with BWDB. 
 
The GPWM built on the NWP by setting out a three-tier institutional framework for WMO, 
namely Water Management Groups (WMGs) at the lowest level, Water Management 
Associations (WMAs) at the mid-tier and Water Management Federations (WMFs) at the 
apex. The combination of groups, associations and federations at a particular scheme are 
together known as its Water Management Organization (WMO). To provide a legal 
framework for the operation of these WMOs, the Cooperatives Ordinance, 1984 and 
Cooperative Societies Rules, 1987 were amended in 2001 to provide enabling legal 
provisions for alternative forms of water management groups, namely WMAs for schemes 
greater than 1,000 ha and water management cooperative associations (WMCAs) for 
schemes less than 1,000 ha (ADB 2003b). The Guidelines recommend that WMAs be 
registered under the Cooperatives Societies Ordinance and Rules until such time that 
separate rules for registration are established, and a large number of WMAs have been 
established under several water sector projects implemented by BWDB and LGED. The 
central objective of the Guidelines is to develop the long-term capacity of local stakeholders 
in the management of water resources, to develop a local ownership ethos and to ensure 
fair outcomes for affected persons (Lewins and Robens 2004).  
 
Table 1. Duties and responsibilities of different units within a WMO 
Water Management 
Group 
Water Management Association Water Management 
Federation 
Initiation of stakeholder 
activities through 
preliminary discussions, 
meetings and 
motivational exercises 
Preparation of budgets and 
participation in overall activities 
 
Liaison with the 
implementing agency 
Drafting the working 
procedures and the 
process of interaction. 
 
Liaison with implementing 
agencies, NGOs, community level 
organizations and LGIs. 
Resolution of conflicts referred to 
it by WMGs. 
Oversight of the WMAs. 
Mobilization of efforts to 
enforce rules and 
procedures regarding water 
management. 
Preparation of documents 
and reports. 
 
Signing of management transfer 
agreements on behalf of the 
WMGs with implementing 
agencies or LGIs as appropriate. 
Coordination of 
stakeholder functions in 
water management. 
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Water Management 
Group 
Water Management Association Water Management 
Federation 
Participation throughout 
the scheme cycle. 
 
Formal representation of the 
beneficiaries and scheme affected 
people on all issues related to 
water management. 
Formal representation of 
the beneficiaries and 
scheme affected people on 
all issues related to water 
management. 
Preparation of annual 
crop/other production 
and operation and 
maintenance plans. 
Preparation of annual production 
plans and/or collate the 
production plans emanating from 
the WMGs. 
 
Preparation of annual 
production plans and/or 
compilation of the 
production plans 
emanating from the WMAs. 
Mobilization of local 
resources and collection 
of member contribution 
towards investment and 
recurring costs. 
 
Collection of beneficiary 
contribution towards scheme 
investment and operation costs, 
and collection of consolidated 
contributions from WMGs as 
appropriate. 
Collection, where 
applicable, of beneficiary 
contributions towards 
scheme level operation and 
maintenance. 
Maintenance of accounts. Supervision and guidance on 
maintenance of accounts. 
Financial oversight. 
Work with implementing 
agencies, NGOs, 
community level 
organizations and LGIs. 
 
Participation in the supervision of 
scheme implementation to ensure 
that the works are as per design 
and agreement. 
Observation of scheme 
construction to ensure 
compliance with designs 
and agreements. 
Progressive sharing of 
water management 
responsibilities. 
 
Operation and maintenance of 
works in accordance with any 
leasing agreement. 
 
On its completion, leasing 
of the scheme level 
infrastructure from the 
implementing agency and 
operate/maintain as per 
the terms of the lease. 
Resolution of conflicts, 
election of office bearers, 
exploration of additional 
water based economic 
activities that could be 
engaged by the group. 
Assistance with the arrangement 
of training and general capacity 
building initiatives with 
Government or NGOs for various 
stakeholders. 
 
Assistance with the 
arrangement of training 
and general capacity 
building initiatives with 
Government or NGOs for 
various stakeholders. 
Source: GoB 2006. 
 
The WMGs operate at the grass-roots and are meant to be directly involved in water 
management while the WMAs are to provide the necessary coordination at the scheme 
level. The highest common denominator (WMA) is the point of formal interface between a 
water sector agency and a WMO. This is the level where formal agreements relating to 
respective duties and obligations of the parties concerned are to be signed. For each 
scheme, there are to be at least one level of WMO. The number and level of WMOs to be 
formed in any scheme is to be decided by the stakeholders on the basis of their preference 
and in consideration of the size and complexity of the scheme. 
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Table 2. WMO structure according to project/scheme size as envisaged in the Guidelines on 
Participatory Water Management. 
Sub-Project/Scheme up to 
1000 ha 
Project/Subproject/Scheme 
above 1000 ha but less than 
5000 ha 
Project/ Sub-project/ 
scheme above 5000 ha 
 WMG at the lowest 
level for each smallest 
hydrological unit or 
social unit (Para/Village) 
 WMA at the apex level 
of the project/ sub-
project/ scheme. 
 WMG at the lowest level 
for each smallest 
hydrological unit or social 
unit (Para/Village) 
 WMA either at the mid-
level for each sub-system 
of the project/ sub-
project/ scheme or at the 
apex 
 level for the project/ sub-
project/ scheme 
 If necessary, WMF at the 
apex level of the project/ 
sub-project/ scheme in 
case WMA is formed at 
the mid-level for each 
sub-system. 
 WMG at the lowest level 
for each smallest 
hydrological unit or social 
unit (Para/village) 
 WMA at the mid level for 
each sub-system of the 
project/ sub-project/ 
scheme 
 WMF at the apex level of 
the project/ sub-project/ 
scheme. 
Compiled from Hussain 2004 
 
 
Table 3. Stages of Participatory Process in Scheme Cycle (Guidelines on Participatory Water 
Management). 
Stages Activities 
Identification/ 
Pre-feasibility 
Study 
 
• Local level meetings / discussions 
• Work with local interest groups and Local Government Institutions 
• Inventory of problems / constraints / potentials 
• Assessment and reconnaissance of social, agricultural, fishery, 
livestock and environmental issues 
Feasibility 
Study 
 
• Social assessment involving stakeholders through survey and PRA 
• Solicit opinion of local stakeholders 
• Assess capacity of local stakeholders for participation 
• Create environment for formation of WMO 
• Determine proposed scheme boundaries 
• Carry out detailed studies on technical, social, agricultural, fishery, 
forestry, livestock and environmental aspects 
• Identify opposition to proposed interventions and mitigation measures 
Detailed 
planning, 
design  
 
• Close interaction between design team and WMO 
• Feedback on proposed design 
• Delineate boundary in relation to WMO 
• Form appropriate WMO 
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Stages Activities 
 • Arrange registration of WMO Sign implementation agreement 
• Prepare production plans for agriculture, fishery, forestry, livestock 
and environmental plan based on the feasibility study 
• Develop compensation plan for negative impacts 
• Detailed design based on feedback from beneficiaries 
Implementation 
and trial 
operation 
• Further consolidate WMO activities 
• Assist in monitoring and supervision 
• Participate with cash or labor during construction 
• Prepare local resources mobilization plan 
• Put up suggestions for improvement and lodge complaint, if  any 
• Develop O&M plan 
• Implement production plan 
• Implement environmental management plan 
Operation and 
maintenance 
• Realize O&M costs 
• Receive training 
• Carry out WMO activities 
• Transfer of ownership / management of schemes 
• Implement O&M plan 
• Implement production plans 
• Implement environmental management plans 
Monitoring and 
evaluation 
• Progress of membership of WMO 
• Progress of women participation in WMO 
• Progress of beneficiary contribution 
• Monitoring and evaluation survey 
• Progress of scheme construction work 
• Progress of productive activities 
• Progress of environmental management plan 
Source: GoB 2006. 
 
The GPWM envisions a definite role for the Local Government Institutions (LGIs) consisting 
of Union Thana and Zila Parishads in facilitating the work of WMOs through the respective 
standing committees of the different Parishads whose members are expected to act as 
advisors to the concerned WMOs. The LGIs would also be involved at their respective levels 
in the transfer of ownership and management of different sizes of schemes. 
 
Entry of the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) in the small scale water 
sector through the Small Scale Water Resources Development Sector Project (SSWRDSP), 
saw the creation of an alternate WMO model to that recommended in the GPWM. Known 
as Water Management Associations (WMAs), these are a one-tier institution developed for 
all its subprojects. Both BWDB and LGED are following the concept of the Camilla model but 
with significant deviations in structural composition from the original model. While the 
LGED follows a one-tier system, the BWDB has followed the three-tier model in all its recent 
projects, focusing on the formation of the WMGs as the primary unit of WMO. The 
difference in approach between the two agencies might reflect the different types of 
schemes being handled by them. While LGED is dealing with small schemes having a 
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command of 1000 ha or less, BWDB is looking after very large systems, a few of them having 
a command of more than 50,000 ha. (GOB 2006). 
 
WMOs can obtain legal status by registering under one of four laws: the Societies 
Registration Act 1860; the  Trust Act 1984; the Companies Act 1994 and the Cooperative 
Societies Act, 2001. After examining various options, LGED opted to get the its WMOs 
registered under the cooperative law. In a somewhat different form, the WMOs under the 
BWDB schemes are also registered under the same law. 
 
 
5. Selected case studies in WMO creation, operation and results 
The BWDB and LGED are the implementing agencies for large scale and small scale projects 
respectively and the case studies attempt to explore their respective approaches to 
establishing, operationalizing and supporting WMOs. These examples will also provide 
information on the end results from a water management and development perspectives 
and identify underlying drivers of these results, to the degree information is available. 
 
5.1 LGED’s Water Management Co-operative Associations (WMCAs) under the Small Scale 
Water Resource Development Sector Project (SSWRDSP) 
Funded by ADB and currently in its third phase, the SSWRDSP was in many ways an 
experimental project for testing new approaches and processes for participatory water 
management in small-scale water schemes (Akhter et al. 2000).  The Project provides flood 
control, drainage or irrigation infrastructure to subproject areas less than 1,000 ha. The 
approach relies heavily on local stakeholders’ initiative to identify interventions, ratify 
engineering design, demonstrate commitment to operating and maintaining infrastructure 
by contributing a specified amount of funds in advance of physical construction, and to sign 
a post-construction lease agreement for managing, operating, and maintaining the 
infrastructure. The project’s strategy includedes not only the process of organizing 
stakeholders and beneficiaries, mostly poor people and small farmers, into effective co-
operative organizations, but also the introduction within LGED of responsibility for, and 
commitment to the development of small-scale water resources development schemes and 
supporting WMCAs in their operation and maintenance (ADB 2003b). In total 280 WMCAs 
were formed. 
 
The ultimate objective of the WMCAs is to increase agricultural production through proper 
O&M of the infrastructure created for management of the water resources, which will in 
turn contribute to reduction of poverty (ADB 2003b). The arrangement of the village 
meetings to discuss various issues related to the project was the major task of the WMCAs 
(ADB 2003a). 
 
Participation was based on three principles:   
 
• Subprojects are identified by local people and their elected representatives in the 
Union Parishad; 
• Local people, beneficiaries and project-affected people are to be involved in all 
stages of sub-project development; and 
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• The overall approach tried to combine institutional and technical issues which 
was a significant factor missing in many previous projects. 
 
To be a member of a WMCA, each person was required to buy a minimum of one share at a 
cost that varied between WMCAs. In most WMCAs, the maximum number of shares per 
member was limited to between 10 and 100, although some subprojects allow 
shareholdings up to the legally allowed maximum of 20% of total share capital per member. 
In at least two cases, the provision for allowing up to 20% of capital to be held by any 
individual has been used by the WMCAs to expand their capital base and thus the funds 
available for microcredit programs or WMCA commercial activities (ADB 2007). 
 
A socio-economist worked with LGED and assisted the WMCAs to be registered under the 
Registrar of Co-operatives, and establish links with the Upazila level government officers 
who are their sector-based service providers (Akhter et al. 2000). LGED also enlisted the 
services of NGOs to motivate community members to form the WMCAs and to make the 
initial beneficiary contributions (ADB 2003b). 
 
Once the WMCA is formed, the final design of the subprojects is presented to the first AGM 
of the WMCA which decides whether it is to be approved. If approved, and once the 
Managing Committee of the WMCA is in place (elected at the AGM), an agreement is signed 
between the WMCA and LGED to proceed with implementation. This process took between 
14-16 months. The functions of the WMCA during implementation included collecting the 
beneficiaries’ contributions (totaling one year’s O&M costs) towards the construction work. 
The WMCAs are also responsible for monitoring implementation and resolving disputes over 
land that may impede implementation. After completion of construction, the project assists 
the WMCA for a year in O&M of the subproject. After this year, the WMCAs receive the 
project infrastructure, which include the actual water bodies and other LGED-constructed or 
repaired infrastructure on leasehold for a 20-year period. Usually the WMCAs have the sole 
legal right to use, operate and maintain the infrastructure for day to day management of the 
water for various kinds of water-using activities including cultivation and fisheries (ADB 
2003b). 
 
Each WMCA has one president and one secretary, but only some of them were found to 
have a treasurer. The number of female office bearers was only 3 of a possible 76 (ADB 
2003b). Each WMCA is managed by a management committee. As per cooperative society 
rules, WMCAs hold elections every 3 years and regular annual general meetings during 
which the completed annual audit is presented. The functions of the management 
committee include: (i) organizing the beneficiaries of the subprojects, including their 
participation and sharing in the O&M activities of the infrastructure, (ii) helping their 
members in income-generation activities through microcredit programs, and (iii) facilitating 
training of their members. Nineteen of the 22 subprojects investigated (ADB 2007) were 
found to have an active management committee which functions regularly. The active 
WMCAs have various functional subcommittees such as the construction and observation, 
O&M, agricultural, microcredit/loan, and women’s subcommittees. Some of the WMCAs 
have village committees for closer connectivity with the beneficiaries. Eleven of the 19 
active WMCAs had paid employees. The other WMCAs operated through voluntary service 
(ADB 2007). 
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With respect to project development and implementation, in SSWRDSP Phase I 
LGED/Project officials approached the community with the offer to implement a sub project 
provided the community agrees to form a cooperative organization and fulfill other 
conditions, including raising of the O&M fund. The sub project proposal had to be initiated 
formally by the Union Parishad and approved by the Thana Development Coordination 
Committee (TDCC). A set of 12 conditions have to be met by the WMCA before an 
Implementation Agreement (IA) can be signed between LGED and the WMCA. One of these 
conditions stipulates that the plan and design of the sub project must be approved by the 
WMCA. This situation started changing during Phase II with initiatives coming from the 
community or a LGI which approaches LGED to implement a particular sub project. The 12 
conditions clearly spell out the obligations the beneficiaries will have to discharge should 
they decide to accept a scheme. The IA in turn, underlines the responsibilities of the LGED 
with regard to the future upkeep of the scheme. This is thus meant to generate a clear 
understanding between the parties prior to commencement of any physical work (GoB 
2006). 
 
Many WMCAs adopted a micro-credit programme to support members’ livelihood activities. 
The capital base for each WMCA microcredit program is made up of the proceeds from the 
sale of shares  and the accumulated savings of individual members with the WMCA. Each 
member is required to contribute each month to a savings account, usually Tk10 but up to 
Tk100, depending on the WMCA by-law. Collection rates of WMCAs visited were generally 
high, but not 100% in all subprojects. The funds generated from monthly savings and 
purchase of shares are used to provide microcredit loans to members, with an interest rate 
of up to 15% (ADB 2007). 
 
 
5.1.1 Results under SSWRDSP 
WMO formation and participation: Implementation of a second phase (SSWRDSP-2) 
provided LGED the opportunity to learn from and incorporate the lessons arising from Phase 
I, and in that sense, Phase I fulfilled the experimental approach it was meant to. Information 
in the available literature however is lacking with respect to details of these adjustments. 
The external evaluation report for Phase I (ADB 2003b) for instance highlights the need for 
specific measures to ensure that poor people, small farmers and destitute women get 
benefit from the sub-projects, but the underlying structural and process weaknesses are not 
explored. The report does mention that interest groups influenced the sub-project 
preparation and selection processes, but no details are provided.  
 
The same report found women in the membership to be low, but this appears to have 
changed subsequently (ADB 2007) through the WMCAs’ women’s subcommittees and in 
income-generating activities funded through the WMCA microcredit programs. This had 
resulted in higher self-esteem among these women who were able to contribute more to 
family incomes. In addition, women were more visible in their respective communities. The 
management committee of each WMCA had 3–4 women members as required by the 
Project. One of the subprojects was even chaired by a woman. This had enabled a number 
of women to actively participate in overall management and decision-making process in 
their respective WMCAs. Women were found to take part substantially in income-
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generating activities through the microcredit programs. Many women had also been trained 
in cooperatives, income-generating skills, and environmental awareness. 
 
The occupational pattern indicates the WMCA leaders to be non-poor (ADB 2003b). Their 
land holding pattern showed them to be affluent and quite atypical of the land holding 
pattern found in rural Bangladesh, with 54% of them owning more than 5 acres. The sample 
land holding pattern indicated that the leadership of the WMCAs is vested in the hands of 
the comparatively rich and influential people, although the WMCAs are supposed to work 
for the community (composed to a large extent of the poor) as a whole. 
 
Despite these inequalities within the membership, the beneficiaries of the subprojects 
visited by a 2007 study (ADB 2007) were found to be moderately to highly motivated and 
interested in WMCAs overall. Such interest was partly attributed to their sense of 
ownership, which in turn was to some extent a result of the beneficiaries’ involvement in 
their respective subprojects from planning to implementation and to O&M. The 
beneficiaries believed that the subproject has brought stability to production conditions and 
had increased food production and employment for the poor. These findings appear to be 
corroborated by a study the previous year (GoB 2006) which noted a significant increase in 
the membership of WMCAs from initial formation. The study found women constituted 
about 40 percent of the membership of the WMCAs surveyed, with membership increasing 
by 760% on average.  
 
A subsequent study by Sultana and Thompson (2010a) however found that the local fishers 
(over 50 households in the study site, virtually none of whom joined the cooperative) 
reported declining catches due to operation in favour of agriculture. They claimed the 
WMCA completely ignored their interests, and excluded the very poor through its share 
system and decision making that was dominated by local elites. The same study found that 
conflicts between richer leaders and poorer cooperative members were serious in about 40 
per cent of studied sub-projects, and this included competition for credit: in most cases very 
poor members did not get credit. Farmers and fishers both need water for their livelihoods 
but have contradicting uses and objectives. Fishers deed water to enter the floodplain when 
farmers do not (e.g. during dry season paddy harvest when fish try to migrate in to spawn). 
None of the WMCAs had fully resolved this conflict of interest between fishers and farmers. 
 
Operation & Maintenance: The findings of investigations into the WMCAs under the 
SSWRDSP appear to vary according to the time at which each study was conducted. The 
assessment of Phase I commissioned by the ADB (ADB 2003b) did not find the WMCAs to be 
working well. It found that in some WMCAs the O&M sub-committee was inactive, and half 
of the WMCAs had no O&M Plan. Little significance appears to have been attached to O&M 
by the WMCAs whose members seemed more interested in poverty alleviation, social 
development and micro credit programs. When interviewed, no one had highlighted 
sustainable water resource management through proper O&M as a priority. Though 
maintenance requirements for facilities of completed sub projects are determined jointly by 
the WMCA and LGED at present, WMCA contribution towards such maintenance was still 
found to be insignificant in 2006 (GoB 2006), generally in the region of 10 percent of cost. 
However, this report was of the opinion that the reason may not be the inability to do so as 
the report states that some WMCAs are already capable of meeting most O&M fund 
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requirements. A study in 2007 (ADB 2007) however found that all the WMCAs participated 
in O&M activities—the minimum being to keep the subproject running. Beneficiary 
contributions to O&M may be in cash, kind, or labor. Labor contributions constitute a 
significant portion of WMCA contributions to the cost of O&M, since much of the work 
required, especially for maintenance of embankments and canals, is manual (such as 
greasing and painting of sluices, repairing rain cuts and small damage to embankments, 
resetting protective blocks). Emergency works are done with LGED funds. This progression 
seems to be confirmed by a report two years later (ADB 2009) which concluded that 
WMCAs are capable of organizing and implementing routine O&M but they need the 
assistance of LGED for major items of maintenance work. Sultana and Thompson (2010a) 
confirm that the WMCAs appear to be flourishing, successfully maintaining and operating 
the flood control infrastructure. 
 
Influence on water management: Literature which addressed this aspect could not be 
found, with the majority of project as well as independent reviews concentrating almost 
exclusively on levels of participation and the discharge of O&M functions. While conflict 
over access to water was referred to with respect to conflicts between agriculture and 
prawn farming, no detailed discussion was available of the role played by WMCAs in this 
process. A more general discussion of the role of WMCAs within an integrated water 
resources management framework was also absent. 
 
Impacts on local development: As cooperative associations, WMCAs are entitled to carry 
out all normal activities of a cooperative which includes credit activities. Under SSWRDSP 
almost 80 per cent of WMCAs had some kind of micro-credit programme. Mainly the 
members of the WMCA who are poor, needy and also pay the savings regularly can obtain a 
loan (ADB 2003b). 
 
Nowreen et al. (2011) found that fish culture features as a prominent activity, although the 
profits were not equally and fairly distributed. Not all landowners of the flooded rice field 
were allowed to be included as members of the WMCA due to a pre-set limit on the number 
of members. As a result non-members, the majority of whom were the local poor and 
marginalized farmers, did not get any profit. While by mid-June, once the water covers the 
rice fields, the land had traditionally become a common property fishery. The culture fish 
however tends to exclude a large number of poor households and fewer and fewer 
households have access to what previously were common pool fisheries. In contrast, 
business rather than agriculture is the primary source of income of the dominant members 
of WMCAs (ADB 2007, Sultana and Thompson 2010a, Nowreen et al. 2011). They have in 
fact diversified livelihoods away from agriculture and have accumulated more financial 
capital. This had enabled this group to capture control of the project through control of the 
WMCA and limited its members to 500 to ensure their influence is not diluted. This enabled 
them to control the operation of existing sluice gate for flood control and drainage in line 
with their shrimp culture operations. The benefits for the landless appear to be restricted to 
an increased demand for agricultural labor following the intensification of agricultural 
production. In addition, the Project helped improve access of the rural poor to credit 
through the microcredit program of the WMCAs, which supported income-generating 
activities (ADB 2007). No details of these activities were available. 
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While the overall benefits may have been positive at the community level, the scenario at 
the household level was quite different with the level of benefits higher for the large land 
owners and those who successfully adopted shrimp culture compared to and often at the 
expense of the poorer farmers and the landless. This inequality may have been offset to 
some extent by the micro-credit programs that have generated tangible benefits such as 
opportunities for tree plantation, poultry raising, kitchen gardening, and livestock rearing 
and fattening. By securing management of flooding, drainage, and other aspects of water 
management in the subproject areas, the Project has established safe conditions for 
increased investment by households in both agricultural and nonagricultural activities (ADB 
2007).  
 
Interestingly, despite the differentiated distribution of benefits, a review by ADB (2009) 
found that all land owners had a positive view of WMCAs – large landholders saw WMCAs as 
facilitators of O&M while small landholders saw WMCAs as a good source of micro-credit no 
matter how small available funds were, as WMCA micro-credit is often cheaper than similar 
NGO supported programs. 
 
Sustainability: An external review of SSDWRDSP (ADB 2003b) is of the opinion that even 
after the first seven years of the Project, even the most successful sub-projects and WMCAs 
will require additional support to help them to further develop into the required responsible 
and resourceful organizations in charge of sustainable operations and management of the 
small-scale water management schemes. The areas requiring support were (i) management 
and administration of co-operatives;  (ii) technical assistance for identification and 
implementation of the water-related infrastructure; (iii) assistance related to identification 
and implementation of community development activities, and (iv) management and 
administration of the associated micro-credit facility, and interagency co-operation. 
 
By 2005, Choudhury concluded that the WMCA development process has been effective in 
enough cases to confirm its viability, noting that many of the interventions have also 
contributed effectively to increased food production and to poverty reduction. An ADB 
review (ADB 2007) also believed that the WMCAs are generally sustainable, taking into 
consideration the WMCAs’ survival for the past 5 years. It states that the Project on the 
whole was responsible for the institutionalization of beneficiary participation in small-scale 
water projects. One reason for this may be that by 2006 the functions of the WMAs were no 
longer confined to water management alone. They had evolved into multipurpose 
cooperative societies, with multifarious activities, micro credit being a significant activity for 
most. Increased enrollment of new members in the WMCAs also suggested the presence of 
mutuality of interests among the partner organizations which is an important precondition 
of their sustainability (GoB 2006).  
 
Since not all WMCAs performed the same however. Some factors adversely affecting the 
sustainability of the Harisona-Kandial WMCA included a non-resident chairman; change in 
Union Parishad leadership and default of loans provided from external sources. While 
acknowledging the existence of shortcomings in SSWDRSP I, the authors of this report were 
of the view that LGED seems to recognize these problems and has tried to avoid those in 
SSWRDSP II. The insistence on strict adherence to the steps in the project development 
cycle in the right sequence and the rigorous application of the requirement of fulfilling 12 
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conditions prior to signing the Implementation Agreement was seen as evidence of 
recognition of lessons from past mistakes and adopting corrective measures to avoid them 
in future (GoB 2006). 
 
One condition that appears irrespective of the performance of WMCAs is that LGED, 
through its IWRMU needs to continue the long term maintenance monitoring of physical 
infrastructure in the interest of sustainability of WMCAs and subprojects (ADB 2009). 
 
With respect to microcredit, a relatively recent evaluation (ADB 2009) concluded that LGED 
is not in a position to manage the microcredit programs of a large number of WMCAs to 
keep them active. Neither the LGED nor the WMCAs have that capacity to embark on 
professional microfinance programs. The report recommended that loan guarantee should 
not be used as an incentive for large-scale expansion of microcredit. This was following a 
study the previous year (ADB 2008b) which found that only a few WMCAs had microcredit 
operations that were rated as good performance. Although over half of the SSW-2 WMCAs 
were rated as “fair”, most of these showed signs of becoming “very weak” or “inactive” 
before long. The study found that direct support from project staff in such tasks as keeping 
accounts is helping this group to continue to function for the time being. It was also 
revealed that in 13 out of 30 WMCAs visited, bad debt had accumulated and members had 
lost their savings and share capital. In the more successful microcredit programs, the loans 
were limited to small amounts. These WMCAs were mainly CAD schemes where seasonal 
microcredit fits well with the business of selling irrigation water. Other types of scheme 
lacked such a regular business on which it is easy to attach a small microcredit operation. 
Significantly, the study failed to find a link between microfinance operations and sustainable 
subproject infrastructure O&M. 
 
Inter-agency coordination: In the case of SSWRDSP Phase I, the external evaluation report 
(ADB 2003b) found that there appeared to be little consultation between LGED and WMCA 
or Fisheries Department concerning fishery aspects during project planning and 
implementation. In a few areas, poor fishermen (making a living out of natural fisheries) 
were opposed to culture fisheries. The report proposed developing fisheries capacities of 
the WMCA and stressed that marketing and transportation will also need to feature 
prominently. This example serves to highlight the critical need for investments well beyond 
access to and management of resources if the actual value of these resources are to be 
realized for peoples’ development. The situation appears to have changed by 2006 when 
another evaluation (GoB 2006) reported that LGED and DOC appear to be working closely 
together in formation and nurturing of WMOs. They had in fact jointly issued a circular 
regarding the procedure for formation of LGED WMOs. This had engendered a positive 
attitude among the officials of both the organizations at the field level for a more 
harmonious and coordinated approach for the further development of the WMOs.  
 
No reference was available on the relationships with the other agencies relevant to the 
water sector and more broadly to rural development. These include the agencies in charge 
of land, agriculture and fisheries, and the local government organizations. 
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5.2 The Systems Rehabilitation Project under BWDB  
The Systems Rehabilitation Project in the early 1990s was implemented by BWDB aiming at 
sustainable O&M in rehabilitated projects by forming local Water User Groups (WUGs) 
comprised of farmers organized around hydrological units. As noted by Soussan at al. (1997) 
the scale of WUG formation was “amazing” especially during 1995-96 when 1,386 WUGs 
were formed during the year. By the end of June 1997, 3,506 WUGs had been registered in 
35 sub-projects. According to Lewins and Robens (2004) however, although participation 
was established very early in project implementation, it was primarily an attempt to hasten 
the identification of land for the sub-projects, and to introduce a mode of negotiation and 
reduce conflict between the plot-owners. Hussain (2004) further observes that as the 
process of establishing WMOs became target-oriented, the effectiveness and functionality 
of groups after formation was lost. The same author notes that these are characteristics 
found in many similar projects and that the WMG formation process has had little success in 
initiating a community based management of the operation and maintenance of water 
control structures.  
 
The assessment of the participatory mobilization and group formation process within SRP 
has been characterized as one where local elites are selected into a largely nominal 
organizational structure which is presented as representing the "people" whilst the vast bulk 
of the population is not aware of the existence of these bodies and has never participated in 
any activities associated with their formation or functioning (Soussan at al. 1997). There was 
therefore a lack of any coherent vision on why the WUGs were being formed, and they had 
no function and quickly became disillusioned. This was also compounded by the fact that 
only farmers and not all stakeholders were involved in the process, thereby excluding other 
water users from the WUG system. The participation process reflected the centralized, 
construction-oriented character of both the project and the BWDB which was responsible 
for implementing it. This approach paralleled that found in other water sector projects at 
that time (Soussan at al. 1997). 
 
5.3 BWDB’s Ganges-Kobadak Project (G-K) and the Pabna Irrigation and Rural 
Development Project (PIRDP) 
In the late 1990s, the BWDB sought to institute participatory water management in G-K to 
promote sustainable improvements in irrigation performance and rapid adoption of new 
HYV technology in rice and wheat. To that end, exiting Outlet Committees were re-named as 
WMGs comprised of nine members: one-third each from large, medium and small farm 
categories. 10-15 WMGs from each of the tertiary canals were then formed into Water 
Management Associations which were expected to manage water distribution in all field 
outlets from head to tail attached to the same tertiary canal. The WMGs and WMAs worked 
under close supervision of the BWDB officials, responsible for distribution of water up to the 
tertiaries and their expansion in the project areas. These institutional changes at the field 
level were expected to help increase crop production and productivity for all categories of 
farm households, especially the poor farmers, given equitable access to water and irrigation 
water use efficiency. Furthermore, the differences in irrigation performance between the 
head and the tail end reaches were expected to be narrowed as a result of improved water 
distribution, provided the farmers are equally responsive to improving agronomic practices 
and input use. Distribution of irrigation water for crop use from available flows in the canals 
in both G-K and PIRDP was determined by the WMGs and the corresponding WMAs in 
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collaboration with the BWDB field officials. Irrigation water was to be distributed to the crop 
fields on the basis of requirements with reference to land quality, given the availability of 
surface water in the tertiary canals. Any conflict relating to the distribution of water was to 
be addressed by BWDB in consultation with the WMGs (Hussain 2004). 
 
According to the study conducted by Hussain (2004), the situation in G-K showed that in the 
‘best’ performing canal area, access of households to WMGs and WMAs was the highest and 
the member farmers were well-informed about the relevant issues. In these canals, success 
was determined largely by the active participation of water users through WMGs and WMAs 
and the efficiency of the BWDB officials in supporting them. In the ‘worst’ tertiary, proper 
formation of WMGs and WMAs had not occurred and the farmers did not have access to 
systematic irrigation information. It was further noted that only few meetings of the general 
bodies of the groups and associations were held in GK. In PIRDP performance of the WMGs 
and WMAs was found to be poor. Institutional constraints such as poor performance of the 
concerned government officials, problems with the patwary, theft of water etc., had not 
been addressed. Collection of the water charges was poor in both G-K and PIRDP. In G-K as a 
whole, annual rates of collection in the 1990s ranged from 5 percent to 15 percent of the 
targeted sum; moreover, the collection rate had fallen overtime. In PIRDP, collection was to 
only 9 percent for 2000/01. 
 
The study found that overall, the head tertiaries performed better, while improved 
performance was also exhibited by the middle tertiaries, while a mixed picture emerged 
from the tail tertiaries. Although larger landowners benefit more, small landowners had also 
secured irrigation water. The land-poor and the landless had also derived benefits from 
increased employment resulting from more HYV varieties being cultivated. The benefits they 
derived however remained limited given their very limited access to land. Moreover, the 
study concluded that proportional sharing of benefits of irrigation accruing to different sizes 
of farms may not necessarily happen due to various reasons such as shortage of irrigation 
water in the canal leading to its chaotic distribution, improper location of outlets and 
irrigation channels, mismanagement by the BWDB staff, and unfavorable land topography. 
This was exacerbated by land distribution being highly skewed in both G-K and PIRDP. Small 
farmers (owning 0.21 to 1.0 ha/household) and the landless (defined as owning less than 0.2 
ha/household) constituted 71% of all farmers in G-K. This 71% in G-K owned just 25 percent 
of the irrigated land, while 78 percent of farmers owned 45 percent in PIRDP.    
 
These findings appear to be corroborated by a study (GoB 2006) that surveyed 39 BWDB 
WMOs (21 cooperative organizations and 18 informal groups) distributed in 5 projects (GK, 
MDIP, PIRDP, CPP, CDSP). WMOs in 4 of the projects were either virtually non-existent or 
dilapidated. Most WMOs had no office of their own, meet infrequently if at all, and had very 
little in terms of institutional training. Their activities appeared to be limited to surveillance 
of the embankment and operation of gates. Collection of member contributions was only 
15-25%. The same study states that of the 5 BWDB projects surveyed, the 3 FCDI projects 
(GK, PIRDP and MDIP) were implemented unilaterally without any thought to stakeholder or 
beneficiary participation, and efforts to form WMO and realize water rates or service charge 
began many years after project completion (GoB 2006). It found that differences in terms of 
institutional context, time, circumstances and opportunities for the creation of the WMO 
will give different outcomes unless the negative factors are skillfully handled and 
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neutralized. Evidently, BWDB did not think through these inherent impediments and come 
up with any pragmatic work plan to overcome them.  
 
 
6. Discussion 
While Bangladesh provides many projects involving WMOs over the past 30 years, review of 
the available literature suggests that the case studies selected for this review are indicative 
of the experiences to date. Overall, the documentation suggests poor O&M performance, 
although a distinctly different set of results for LGED and BWDB emerges, with the former’s 
approach appearing to generate some tangible positive results on the ground, be it subject 
to some lingering concerns. The continued weak results from the BWDB projects on the 
other hand do not show the same progress in learning and adapting from experience. By 
2001, in excess of 550 projects had been undertaken by BWDB but there was seen to be a 
serious problem with the lack of local O&M for completed infra-structure and facilities. This 
section highlights some of the key features underlying these experiences as articulated in 
the literature. 
 
6.1 Project specific factors 
 
Clarity of purpose and its relevance to stakeholders: Soussan at al. (1997) point out that an 
effective participatory process will only be effective where the purpose of participating is 
clear and regarded as useful by local people. These characteristics have been noted to be 
generally absent in BWDB projects. Committee members often are assumed to have 
common interests and goals, overlooking social difference and heterogeneity of 
communities as well as environments. Different water users often have different interests, 
and because of these assumptions of homogeneity by donors and implementers, inter-
group conflicts tend to be suppressed, so that the interests of the less powerful are forgone 
and existing inequalities are reinforced in name of social cohesion (Sultana 2009). Reference 
to elite capture indicates that this was an issue with the WMCAs is not clear from the 
reviewed literature. 
 
An out-dated vision of participatory water management and inadequate empowerment: 
Both the BWDB WMOs and LGED WMCAs appear to be captive within a narrow 
conceptualization of what their contributions to local water management should be (i.e. 
O&M), compared with the accumulation of water user conflicts that are multi-dimensional 
and multi-actor in nature. The one significant difference has been the flexibility to engage in 
micro-credit and attract new donor funding enjoyed by the WMCAs. However, while some 
WMCAs may have had more success in sustaining themselves and their O&M functions 
through these strategies, they appear to join the BWDB’s WMOs in having little influence on 
local water management issues. A fundamental cause appears to be the failure to envision a 
role for these organizations as water managers in their own right in keeping with the 
conceptual evolution of   participation at the global (e.g. 1992 Dublin Principles) and 
national (e.g. 1999 Water Policy, 2004 National Water Management Plan) scales. Instead, 
they remain dependent on the centralized management in government irrigation systems.  
 
Exclusivity in participation: The BWDB’s definition of water users (exclusively farmers) and 
integrated water management (surface water for crop production) are at odds with the 
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realities of rural life in Bangladesh (Wood 1999) and exclude key groups of stakeholders 
(such as fishermen, landless and boatmen) and key aspects of water resource management 
such as groundwater utilization, domestic water supply, fishing resources and navigation 
(Soussan at al. 1997). Such factors contribute to the complex realities where access to and 
control over water resources vary by multiple, interlocking and hierarchical systems of 
differentiation. Similarly, participation involves processes of inclusion, exclusion, negotiation 
and resistance, which are insufficiently understood or addressed. Community members are 
expected to participate in projects in order to enhance equity and efficiency, as well as to 
feel greater ownership towards projects, which is also expected to lead to better water 
resources management and greater ecological sustainability. According to Sultana (2009), 
participation invokes notions of inclusion, of people’s abilities to make decisions, and to 
voice opinions⁄concerns that are heard. As such, participation is linked to notions of 
deliberative democracy. Participation has become hegemonic in development discourses, 
yet generally conceals the processes of unjust and illegitimate exercises of power. With 
respect to the WMCAs, while the literature on SSDWRDSP does not address participation in 
water management decisions within the WMCAs, the operation of microcredit programs 
appears to have provided a common point of reference for community members. 
 
The spatial factor highlighted by Coupe et al. (2005) to explain the historical lack of 
organised civil society groups at the local level is another factor affecting participation. The 
authors point out that Bangladesh has open villages with a dispersed, linear pattern of 
settlement, different from the close or corporate villages found in other parts of South Asia. 
Villages in Bangladesh are not administrative units and settlement is based on the para (a 
cluster of hamlets). This militates against tight integration of the population and common 
identity within a local space.  
 
Power relations and power struggles: Coupe et al. (2005) conclude that the formal and 
informal institutions function not as opposites, but in a mutually reinforcing grip on local 
resources. The functioning of formal institutions is shaped by local informal leaders who 
establish patron-client relations which maintain the marginalised segments of the 
community in a chronic state of dependence. Stated from the perspective of participatory 
water management, while notions of community in water management may be externally 
defined by implementing organisations, they are implemented through local power 
relations, where different people with various strengths and weaknesses based on their 
structural position in village society will negotiate their positions within such projects vis-a`-
vis the costs and benefits in the context of their overall lives and livelihoods. As a result, it is 
important to look at the ways that community institutions operate in creating boundaries, 
exclusions, inclusions and regulation (Sultana 2009). 
 
Ability to generate benefits: The SSDWRDSP’s ability to offer tangible benefits, thereby 
making the subprojects useful to the WMCAs emerges prominently (GoB 2006, ADB 2007, 
ADB 2008b). WMCAs with good income generating activities were found to be in a better 
position to perform O&M activities, although there is some concern (and uncertainty) as to 
whether micro-credit (the primary income-generating activity for most WMCAs) has 
distracted their memberships from their O&M responsibilities. While some WMCAs tend to 
focus more on income generating activities especially where leadership lies with 
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entrepreneurs rather than with farmers, the broad mandate of WMCAs1 has enabled 
especially the well-functioning WMCAs to attract other sources of funding from different 
donors. For instance, ADB’s Project Performance Evaluation Report (ADB 2007) reports that 
some WMCAs attracted funds from the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR). The JFPR’s 
Livelihood Improvement for the Poor Project aimed at reducing rural poverty in selected 
subproject areas through livelihood improvement activities by the poor farmers of well-
functioning WMCAs, and strengthening the capacities of WMCAs, through self-governance, 
to manage the poverty-focused activities of the poor. 
 
A Government of Bangladesh study (GoB 2006) found that those WMCAs that were thriving 
through diversification of their activities had more group cohesion and were in fact 
performing their water management responsibilities well. Since water management 
activities can engage WMO members for only 4 to 6 months in a year, the year round 
activity and interaction through micro-credit programs appears to help foster and maintain 
group cohesion and sustainability. An IFAD study2 in 2008 found that WMCAs in Command 
Area Development subprojects have complemented their water responsibilities with 
seasonal loans for marginal farmers through microcredit. Moreover, the surplus that may be 
generated by these other activities help meet the O&M costs and also contribute to the 
socio economic development of the WMO members. The IFAD study did however caution 
that despite the continued support from LGED project staff to WMCAs to continue 
microcredit in SSW-2, the sustainability of WMCAs remains a concern. 
 
The WMCAs prepare and maintain a Poverty Reduction Plan Book which plans and monitors 
all poverty reduction activities. Although this was found to require significant effort by 
WMCA members, LGED field staff, project staff and consultants (ADB 2007), their use was 
recommended since it provides the beneficiaries a clear indication of impacts on poverty 
reduction.  
 
Moreover, the Microfinance Study commissioned by the ADB (2008b) saw some dangers in 
this strategy: 
 
• there was competition from other microfinance providers with access to large 
amounts of capital;  
• there was a lack of paid and trained staff;  
• non-adoption of good microfinance practices such as holding group meetings and 
monitoring loan repayment;  
 
The Study also questioned the assumption that microcredit will help keep WMCAs active 
and felt there was no clear evidence that because of the presence of a microcredit program 
that O&M is being properly carried out. A review by ADB (2003b) however observes that the 
WMCAs may be compelled to provide credit to gain community support. This would apply 
particularly to people without much land who may have little or no benefit due to the water 
resource development. Moreover, given that WMOs are essentially externally-defined 
                                                          
1
 There is no legal bar for a WMCA, as defined in Rule 3 (16) of the Co-operative Societies Rules 2004, to 
undertake activities other than water management. 
2
 A microfinance Study funded by IFAD delivered its Final Report in August 2008. As referred to in ADB 2008b. 
Full citation to report could not be found. 
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organizations, they need to establish a legitimacy in the eyes of the local stakeholders. The 
expansion of livelihood options through micro-credit appears to be the primary strategy to 
do this. 
 
The WMCAs prepare and maintain a Poverty Reduction Plan Book which plans and monitors 
all poverty reduction activities. Although this was found to require significant effort by 
WMCA members, LGED field staff, project staff and consultants (ADB 2007), their use was 
recommended since it provides the beneficiaries a clear indication of impacts on poverty 
reduction.  
 
Ineffectiveness of water infrastructure: An ADB study (ADB 2003a) notes that there has 
been very little progress in the revival of the local government system. Many of the water 
schemes are not properly functioning; so the intended beneficiaries are not deriving any 
benefit from those. Many of these had fallen in serious disrepair and some may actually be 
generating dis-benefits and dampening interest in participation by the intended beneficiary 
groups. Stakeholder participation will have little sustainable impact on investment efficiency 
if the infrastructure with which they are provided is either inappropriate or dysfunctional. 
This is especially the case considering, as described by Hussain (2004), the colonial attitude 
that "any property built/developed by the government is not people/community's property 
but property of the government" has also contributed to lack of community ownership and 
awareness. He opines that the common attitude of the community continues to be that 
management, maintenance and operation of those projects are supposed to be performed 
by the government. Moreover, Mukherji et al. 2010 observe that low, uncollected irrigation 
service fees, growing deferred maintenance, rampant anarchy and inequity in water 
distribution in Asian surface irrigation are symptoms of a larger malaise that PIM/IMT seem 
unable to address. This is a key component when understanding the practical boundaries in 
which WMOs are expected to operate. 
 
Capacity building: A significant aspect of LGED WMCAs is the heavy training input provided 
to office bearers and members of the WMCA. Most Managing Committee members have 
received training on cooperative laws, rules and procedures. Members of the WMCA have 
also received training on such areas as cooperatives, gender, sanitation, agriculture, fishery, 
livestock and poverty alleviation indicating a significantly broader role in local development 
than for the BWDB’s WMOs. Of particular importance has been the training of women 
members on sanitation and hygiene that has had positive impacts on rural housekeeping 
(GoB 2006). The beneficiaries were also trained in fish production techniques, and pond fish 
culture and fingerling production (ADB 2007). Capacity building was also extended to LGED 
officials and consultants (GoB 2006). No such investments are associated with BWDB in the 
reviewed literature. 
 
Orientation and capacities of BWDB and LGED: A critical determinant of successful and 
sustainable WMOs is the orientation, interest and attitude of the sponsoring entity in 
general and of its senior management in particular (Gob 2006). The senior management at 
LGED appears to have recognized the imperatives of peoples’ participation and community 
organization in the conception, execution and management of projects, and tried to acquire 
the capability to foster such peoples’ participation and community organization. This is seen 
through the provision of a strong technical assistance team at LGED headquarters, the 
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provision of a Sociologist at the district level, a Community Organizer at the thana level and 
a NGO facilitator for each sub project/WMCA. The BWDB on the other hand seems to view 
this more as a donor conditionality that has to be met. More often than not BWDB appears 
to go through the motions of meeting the requirement without any conviction. 
Consequently, as in the cases of G-K and PIRDP, hundreds of WMO were created in days 
without adequate preparation to meet a deadline. The senior management in BWDB does 
not appear very interested in, or aware of, these non-engineering activities (Gob 2006). 
 
LGED is also at a distinct advantage being a relatively new entrant in the water resources 
sector, having been given a formal mandate for projects up to 1,000 hectares through the 
NWP, although it had started implementing water schemes several years prior to acquiring 
this formal authority (GoB 1996). By the time LGED entered the water sector, the concepts 
of people’s participation in project formulation and management had become a major issue. 
LGED therefore had the opportunity of developing and implementing projects incorporating 
the concepts of peoples’ participation in formulation, implementation, operation and 
management, and without any historical organisational culture to inhibit this process. The 
fact that LGED sub projects are relatively small in size and generally complete in themselves 
makes it possible to have the rather simple arrangement of one single tier WMO for each 
sub project as the appropriate institutional arrangement.  
 
BWDB in contrast is challenged with unburdening itself of a very different institutional 
culture that was in place during its creation in 1959. Most BWDB projects (particularly the 
FCDI projects) were implemented many years ago, when there was little talk or requirement 
of peoples’ participation. Both PIRDP and MDIP for instance were completed and became 
operational many years back, while the WMOs were formed during 1998 to 2000 (GoB 
1996). Unlike with LGED, BWDB’s projects were large, complex and, according to the 
philosophy prevailing at the time, implemented unilaterally. Beneficiary participation was 
sought to be introduced by BWDB as an afterthought without acquiring the necessary skills 
for doing what is a challenging task. Formation of a WMO anew for a project that is in 
operation for many years is also more difficult than forming a WMO prior to project 
implementation. Making people pay for a service they have enjoyed for free is also difficult. 
The preparation for formation of the WMOs was also inadequate. In contrast to the LGED 
projects, the size and complexity of BWDB projects makes this task infinitely more difficult. 
BWDB projects may have hundreds of WMOs, with each WMO dealing with only a small 
part of the project and dependent on the overall project to provide benefits.  
 
Apart from the difficult nature of the task itself, BWDB seems not to have the orientation or 
the in house capability to manage the transition to participatory water management. It is 
fundamentally not suited to developing and managing a participatory process in the opinion 
of Soussan at al. (1997). Institutional deficiencies relate to lack of understanding of water 
management issues, persistence of inappropriate skill mix of their professionals, inadequacy 
of non-engineering water management personnel in the field and lack of training of the such 
professionals (GOB 2006). Local-level BWDB staff are squeezed between the emerging need 
for local accountability and joint decision-making and their accountability to the centre and 
lack of full local decision-making authority in a highly centralized organizational culture. 
There are therefore profound contradictions between expectations of the role of the 
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participatory organizations and the operational characteristics of the BWDB (Soussan at al. 
1997). 
 
Although the BWDB Act of 2000 promotes participatory water management, and the Land 
and Water Use Directorate has been converted into the Water Management Division for 
institutionalizing participatory water management in BWDB projects, this needed to be 
supported by reorientation of the staff of the new Division to the principles and precepts of 
participatory water management. During the past two decades, the BWDB has tried to cover 
its staffing deficiencies for water management by hiring temporary help from outside, 
mainly NGOs or consultants. Unfortunately, there never have been any counterpart 
permanent units in the project organization who were to own and preserve the valuable 
and expensive outputs generated by outside help for internalization within the Board and 
continuous dissemination afterwards. Despite huge investments on community mobilization 
over these years, there is hardly any capacity building within the organization (GoB 2006). 
 
LGED’s commitment to adapt to implementation challenges contrasts quite significantly. 
The organization’s management has thrown its weight behind the necessary internal reform 
processes (ADB 2007). Through the SSDWRDSP, the management has ensured investments 
in LGED’s present capacity at all levels to implement small-scale water resources 
development activities with the participation of beneficiaries. A process for beneficiary 
participation was developed under the SSDWRDSP, which LGED has adopted as an integral 
part of the subproject cycle. LGED has institutionalized coordination mechanisms, including 
the use of ICT, in keeping with organizational theory. Its particular strength is in 
standardization of inputs: training of staff and other stakeholders, including beneficiaries 
and contractors. In spite of the rigid GOB’s rules, LGED exercises discretion in providing both 
direct and indirect staff incentives: early promotion, private use of official vehicles, training 
opportunities, official recognition, welfare services by the staff association, and good 
working environment, among others. LGED’s group cohesiveness, collective decision-making 
practices, internal communications, leadership, and organizational culture have impacted 
positively its effectiveness, thus complementing the division-of-labor system and 
coordination mechanisms (Fujita 2011). Not surprisingly then, most of the LGED staff trained 
under the Project is still with the organization (ADB 2007).  
 
In 2003, LGED established the Integrated Water Resources Management Unit (IWRMU) with 
the support of SSW-2. This Unit is dedicated to the process of identifying and implementing 
water resources development. The Unit is also a key difference between LGED and BWDB. It 
monitors completed projects and is to ensure they are being operated and maintained in 
accordance with agreements signed between LGED and local stakeholders, and provides 
maintenance support. The monitoring framework includes monitoring the health of the 
WMCAs as well as the operability of the infrastructure. Under the SSW 2 project, it has been 
recommended that ten “revenue ” positions for Socio-economists be created in the field at 
regional centers, and two positions within IWRMU at National level, one a Socio-economist 
and one a Gender and Development Officer. These field appointees will monitor the 
performance of subprojects within their region. During the implementation of SSW–2, a DAE 
officer was permanently assigned to IWRMU, and this arrangement is to continue for the 
Project’s duration. In addition it has been agreed that a Fisheries Specialist from the 
Department of Fisheries will be seconded to IWRMU under a similar arrangement (Fujita 
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2011). Recognizing the plight of affected people engaged in floodplain fisheries, LGED signed 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Land in October 2002 to 
ensure user rights to water bodies within the subproject area of the affected people. The 
MOU helps ensure that the beneficiaries have priority access to these water bodies after 
paying standard fees to the Ministry of Land (ADB 2007). 
 
LGED has also recognized the need to actively seek additional funding through the 
Livelihood Improvement for the Poor through Water Management Associations Project. Of 
the total JFPR budget of US$1.05 million, almost $500,000 was given as small loans to the 
Project’s WMCAs to help promote the WMCAs’ sustainability, which in turn is hoped to 
translate in to the sustainability of the subprojects. The anticipated availability of additional 
resources as a result, it is hoped, will increase the WMCAs’ ability to channel some of their 
funds for the O&M of their respective subprojects (ADB 2007).  
 
More fundamentally, as argued by  Suhardiman (2008) and Mukherji et al. (2010) with 
respect to WUAs in general, policy makers assume the relationship between the state 
(usually irrigation) agencies and the WUAs to be neutral and apolitical as the state agency 
tasked with creating the WUAs is assumed to lack any identity or interests of their own. This 
assumes erroneously that new WUAs can be empowered by the very institution these 
organizations are formed to replace. In reality, management transfer has been characterized 
by power struggles between the state agency as the existing power holder and the WUAs as 
the designated future decision makers in irrigation systems management. While this aspect 
is not explicitly discussed in the literature with respect to WUAs in Bangladesh, it is a 
relevant additional perspective in considering especially BWDB’s failure to adjust to the 
evolving discourse on local stakeholder participation in the water sector outside of and 
within Bangladesh. 
 
6.2 Other dimensions affecting WMO formation and functions 
While the discussion above focuses on project-specific results and learning, the following 
discussion covers aspects that emerge as more generic and provide the broader policy, 
institutional, socio-economic and biophysical contexts in which WMOs function and in deed 
appear to exert significant influence over their performance. 
 
The gulf between challenges posed by context specificity and complexity and a panacea 
imagined by external actors: The literature provides examples of but does not adequately 
explore what Sultana (2011) describes as “the complexities, entanglements and messy 
relations that constitute political ecologies of resources management”. Water hardship, 
conflicts and marginalisations are found to be products of social processes (that are 
gendered, classed and spatialised) as well as natural processes (local geohydrology, depth of 
arsenic sediments), in addition to the very ways that community and participation are 
conceptualised and practised (Sultana 2009). The same author concludes that conflicts over 
resources are therefore grounded in emotional geographies of places, people, and 
resources, enabling us to better understand the ways resources and emotions come to 
matter in everyday survival struggles. 
 
The complexity involved in water management and in the relationship between water and 
human well-being is reflected in that access to safe water in rural Bangladesh is predicated 
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upon a variety of factors, such as ownership of land, ownership of a tubewell, socio-spatial 
location in relation to surface or ground water, membership in a water committee, or 
kinship and/or patron–client relations that enable access. While access is often discussed in 
terms such as proximity, distance, time needed, and physical burdens, it is also linked to 
socio- cultural factors such as class barriers, power relations, gendered spaces, and the 
emotional labor needed to negotiate water rights (Sultana 2011).  
 
Onto this highly contextualized canvas has been imposed what Wood et al. (2010) have 
described as ‘the tyranny’ of the participation and empowerment approach as best practice 
in the organizational form of WMOs. The literature on WMOs in Bangladesh begins to show 
that these structures, conceptualized based on an imagined typology of local stakeholder 
interests and behavior (Mukherji et al. 2010) rather than on any specific context, are unable 
to deal with the messiness of ground scenarios. Viewing community ahistorically, as well as 
out of its social and political context, can reinforce existing asymmetrical social/power 
relations. As noted by Sultana (2009), these relations that play out in water management 
can challenge notions of democracy and equity that are increasingly embodied in national 
water development policies uncritically espousing community and participation. Similarly, 
Mukherji et al. (2010) conclude that “farmers’ participation became the goal, rather the 
means of IMT, thereby obliterating the basic fact that farmers are interested in receiving 
adequate and reliable supplies of water in order to increase their production and not 
interested in participation for the sake of it.” Based on case studies and readings of history 
of IMT policy, the same authors claim that it is not so much of an implementation failure of 
IMT/PIM as it is a flaw in the conceptual idea behind it. They argue that the policy discourse 
on IMT has stagnated at the level of consensual discourse given that its policy assumptions 
are never questioned or even discussed, even though from the farmers’ side there is little 
motivation to perform regular maintenance, as this does not significantly increase the actual 
water flow in the canal, despite the link between maintenance and irrigation systems 
efficiency. In practice, they find that farmers solve their water scarcity problem either by 
approaching the irrigation agency staff for additional water supply, or by arranging it 
illegally, rather than through regular maintenance. Coupe et al. (2005 quoting Shivji 2002) 
thus conclude that it is “counterproductive to attempt to resolve contentions over common 
pool resources through ad hoc measures such as creating project led village natural 
resources committees….outside the regular organs of village governance. Whatever the 
short term successes of such measures, in the long run, they are neither sustainable nor 
politically viable and, much less rooted in local politics.” 
 
Broader hydrological realities: The National Water Policy acknowledges that Bangladesh, as 
the lower riparian, has limited control over rivers entering its borders and that it is affected 
by the significant upstream diversions and abstractions that reduce water availability during 
the dry winter months; by the absence of upstream hydrometric data that inhibits 
responses in periods of both flood and drought; and by the general poor quality of water 
entering the country from upstream in some of the basins (World Bank 2005). 
 
Political legacy of centralized government: Soussan at al. (1997) note that rural areas of 
Bangladesh have lacked strong civil institutions which are representative of all stakeholders, 
and the absence of a tradition of accountable state organizations which have a clear 
mandate understood by the rural population. The Union Parishad (a local council covering 
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about 10 villages) remains the only locally elected form of government (Thompson et al. 
2003). With the enactment of the Gram Sarkar (village government) Act (February 2003), 
the government commenced a program to form 40,000 gram sarkars. However, these are 
not intended to be a separate tier in the local government but rather a component part of 
the Union Parishad (World Bank 2005). The development of effective organizations for 
participation in water resource management and good working relationships between such 
local organizations and WMOs will thus be a long process. The experience of LGED since the 
1999 Water Policy however suggests it is an exception to this observation, although the 
same cannot be said of the BWDB. 
 
Conflicting national policies: Prominent examples are the trade policies stimulating growth 
of shrimp cultivation that are in conflict with the goal of the BWDB. While BWDB seeks to 
prevent saline water intrusion, without any change of the rules concerning water 
management, saline water was taken in the polder areas for shrimp cultivation. Shrimp 
cultivation was initiated by either the local elites with large landholdings or big investors 
from outside with political power. The profit interest of these investors in shrimp sector and 
the state’s interest in foreign currency given the increased demand and high price for 
shrimp on the international market, resulted in an expansion of shrimp culture even without 
putting into place any policies regarding water, shrimp and agriculture at the beginning. 
Although BWDB has been working in building water infrastructure to bring in saline water in 
the polders in the areas where fisheries projects have been implemented, in the National 
Water Policy (1999) their objective still remains a check on salinity (Alamgir 2010). Wide-
scale land use conflicts and social unrest have now emerged even though shrimp farming is 
now established as an important industry, contributing 5.2% to GDP, and is the second-
highest foreign exchange earner of the country (Islam 2005). The study by Nowreen et al 
(2011) referred to below suggest that WMOs have been used as vehicles to transform local 
land and water use from agriculture to commercial shrimp production. 
 
Structural constraints of donor support: Most public sector investments in the water sector 
have been provided through (relatively) short term projects with donor support provided 
through centralized executing agencies. The government, burdened with the responsibility 
of providing counterpart financing for the implementation of these projects, under 
significant time pressure to implement sometimes unrealistic schedules, and unable to 
predict what priorities the donor community would next assume, has been poorly 
positioned to manage long-term operation and maintenance of public sector-financed water 
management interventions (World Bank 2005). 
 
Institutional conflict and poor integration: One level of this has been noted between the 
LGED and the BWDB which sometimes find themselves as joint implementing agencies. 
Inadequate levels of cooperation between these two organizations over the operation and 
maintenance of the water structures owned by one institution in the project area of another 
had led to distrust, confusion and conflict that results in low performance of the whole 
physical system (Akhter et al. 2000, Nowreen et al. 2011).  
 
More broadly, not all issues can be or should be addressed at the purely local level and  
there is consequently a need to develop structures which integrate local institutions into the 
wider fabric of the state and civil society. Alamgir (2010) observes that one of the main 
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reasons for conflict over water is the absence of coordination among different institutions. 
The Upazila Executive Office carries out projects like dredging canals to provide support to 
the poor but it is not coordinated with BWDB’s polder management plan. Similarly, 
Department of Fisheries is responsible for leasing out public water bodies, which is not 
planned with the active participation from officials from Department of Agriculture and 
BWDB. Sultana and Thompson (2010a) submit that the ability of the various resource 
management institutions (RMIs) to address different floodplain resource management 
issues is affected by their origins and remit. The water sector RMIs seem to take a narrower 
approach to resource management than the wetland and fishery management RMIs. They 
found that decision making appeared more balanced and participatory in the fishery-related 
projects, which took a more integrated view of floodplain resources. A small scale was not 
necessary for successful resource management, since in the two larger areas the 
combination of local community organizations and higher co-management bodies appeared 
to allow local decision making and appropriate rules to be coordinated between lower RMIs 
and government. Alamgir (2010) thus points out that the struggle between stakeholders for 
water relating to livelihoods is constituted within these contradictions in institutional 
arrangements and conflicting policies. Related to this, Soussan et al. (1997) emphasize the 
need to integrate the process of WMO development and local water resource governance 
into the wider framework of local agencies and civil society. They point out that since in the 
water sector issues are inherently multi-dimensional and dynamic, actions in any one place 
potentially affect other interests upstream and downstream. Therefore, participation at the 
local level needs to be integrated into a wider process of reform of decision-making 
structures and institutional mandates.  
 
Corruption: The issue of shrimp cultivation also bring to the surface the influence of 
corruption that, according to Alamgir (2010) occurs in the Upazila Executive office in 
permitting large shrimp farms and also not resolving the cases of conflicts between rice 
cultivators and shrimp cultivators.  The same author states that corruption also takes place 
in the Department of Fisheries, Upazila Executive Office and Union Council with respect to 
leasing out water bodies, and in creating gates and opening sluice gates in the 
embankments which are related to the BWDB officials.  
 
Land as a source of power and elite capture: Blair (1985) in his analysis of attempts to 
establish local government structures by successive Bangladesh governments between 1958 
and 1985, demonstrates the political and bureaucratic complexities involved in putting a 
culture of local level participation into practice. Those that did exist were captured by the 
rural elite to reinforce the status quo and strengthen the position of the dominant elites at 
the local level.  
 
Alamgir (2010) shows that determining which water will be available in the water system 
and the distribution of the available water is shaped by relations of power which are 
strongly linked to land ownership. Farmers’ access to water is found to be determined by 
their ownership of land. Ownership of land as a productive resource not only facilitates 
access to water but is also crucial for production of power to determine control over the 
water resources. Thus it has been observed that the land rich people are connected to the 
local politics and the local administration. The Union Council was also aligned with the land 
rich people. Therefore, the larger land owners have power to manipulate local 
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administration and rules pertaining to the access to and allocation of water. Rich farmers 
usually control the operation of flood control, drainage and irrigation structures that are 
simple and relatively small. In this way, public goods are used as private goods and operate 
against attempts to reduce existing inequalities in the distribution of project benefits 
(Chowdhury and Rasul 2011). Although the Union Council has a crucial role to play in 
increasing participatory management of water and allocation of water resources, this 
responsibility appears to be at odds with those who control the decision making. 
 
A study by Nowreen et al. (2011) of two neighboring projects (Mondolbari Drainage and 
Kakuibunia-Chinguri) implemented in 1999 by LGED under the first phase of SSWRDSP, 
illustrates the operation of these power dynamics with respect to shrimp farming. They 
report that the WMCA agenda in Mondolbari Drainage was heavily biased towards their 
own economic gains neglecting the social impact they have. The WMCAs were mostly 
controlled by the power group in the community (Rahman et al. 2007). Continuing culture 
fish in the floodplain water body system is an example of this. Most of the benefit, if not all, 
of this culture fish goes to the influential and wealthy farmers creating social issues such as 
access to floodplain fisheries by the poorer traditional fishermen. This has jeopardized 
household nutrition, public health and general social well-being of communities, in 
particular, widows, single women and children. The power group controlling the WMCAs 
has been able to divert the project objectives in favor of culture fish, ignoring the 
requirements for Aman rice cultivation even though the project’s original objective was to 
enhance agriculture. In contrast to Mondolbari Drainage, the absence of any institutional 
conflicts (e.g. between BWDB and LGED), the presence of religious homogeneity (e.g., 
mostly Hindus) and discontinuation of culture fish in the rice fields helped the Kakuibunia-
Chinguri project to be successful (Nowreen et al. 2011). 
 
Reference to institutional and policy conflicts made earlier are played out in the arena of 
land use and ownership, and the many diverse uses of the very limited land especially in the 
coastal zone creates the potential for conflict, with each land use having manifold 
implications for socio-environmental conditions. 
 
6.3 Progress 
Although the above sections focus on the existing challenges to WMOs realizing their 
potential to contribute to local water resources management and overall development, past 
experience also represents a process of evolution through experience. It could be argued 
that this is evident in the removal of two of the most important causes of poor beneficiary 
response: the repetition of the phenomena of inducting beneficiary groups as an after-
thought towards the close of the scheme, and the transfer of funds collected from the 
beneficiaries to the treasury (GoB 2006). Involving the scheme beneficiaries from the very 
conceptual stage of a scheme through the entire scheme cycle has been made mandatory 
through the National Water Policy and the GPWM. The new generation schemes in the 
water sector are mostly designed to meet this requirement, at least on paper. Regarding the 
use of service charges collected by scheme authorities for providing irrigation services, until 
2003, scheme authorities were not allowed to retain the revenue for O&M and were 
required to deposit the entire amount in the government treasury. The beneficiaries were 
reluctant to pay in as much as they did not see the money being used for the benefit of the 
scheme. The Imposition, Collection and Use of Service Charge Regulation (2003) now enable 
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the scheme authorities to retain the fund locally and use it for O&M of the scheme by 
following prescribed government guidelines (GoB 2006). 
 
The GPWM represents progress in that they recognize the central importance of 
participatory decision making, and emphasized a need to move the approach to 
participation beyond BWDB’s “blue-print” approach of establishing target numbers of Water 
User Groups, Water User Committees and Water User Associations each with fixed 
membership rules and remits (Lewins and Robens 2004). However, by codifying the process 
and structure to be followed in establishing WMOs, the GPWM is rather prescriptive 
without appreciating the highly contextual nature of the tasks involved. As such, they may 
be seen as still oriented towards achieving the objectives of the executing agency rather 
than establishing mechanisms to ensure that the agencies are better able to respond to the 
local stakeholders. The disparity between the guidelines (what should happen) and practice 
(what does happen) is also explained (ADB 2003a) as a logical outcome of the lack of 
emphasis on training. The guidelines, as with many institutional and policy changes, are 
promulgated by the Government but the individuals responsible for implementing these are 
not provided with an understanding of how this is to be done (ADB 2003a). 
 
Furthermore, Chadwick and Datta (2003) are of the view that whereas in the past 
government agencies were hostile to concepts of local level involvement in decision-making, 
today, whilst there are still formidable barriers to the emergence of widespread and 
sustained participation, a consensus has been reached in Bangladesh, at least in principle, of 
the need for such a process, and this consensus is reflected in the new National Water 
Policy. The emphasis has been shifted from flood control to water management; from 
purely structural solutions to combinations of structural and non-structural measures, 
designed to meet a broader range of water management needs; and from project 
development purely on considerations to the stakeholders’ participation during in all stages 
of the project development. The participatory water management approach is now 
considered as an effective way to manage the complexity of water management in 
Bangladesh (Choudhury 2005). Chadwick and Datta (2003) further emphasize that the 
importance of the direction this new policy provides cannot be over-stated. What has not 
yet emerged is a robust process through which meaningful participation can be achieved. 
 
The National Water Policy adopted in 1999, talks of water rights, but not specifically about 
irrigation rights and obligations. It is necessary to spell out equitable irrigation rights and 
obligations at the policy level and involve WMGs and WMAs at the field level in the process 
of ensuring that the codified irrigation rights and obligations are properly observed by all 
concerned to ensure equity in water distribution and efficiency in water use. (Hussain 2004) 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
Perceptions of success will depend on the criteria applied to assess an intervention or policy. 
In this study, there are two sets of criteria: the first in line with the original functions of 
O&M assigned to WMOs when introduced in Bangladesh; the second, the far broader 
challenge of being a key, if not the primary, local institution for rational and sustainable 
water resources management. As such, one could argue that the first criterion is historical 
and retrospective in nature, while the second is more an expression of current needs.  
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Many of the assessments of WMO performance in Bangladesh available for this review are 
limited mainly to the historical perspective. While noting that the history of participation in 
modern water resources management programs in Bangladesh is relatively recent, the 
literature suggest that a robust process through which meaningful participation could be 
achieved has not yet emerged. Success has been elusive in the many attempts to achieve 
effective long-term operation and maintenance of flood control and drainage interventions 
(World Bank 2005). With respect to the broader criteria, the experiences, especially under 
SSDWRDSP, seem to suggest that indirect poverty reduction through private investment in 
and maintenance of small-scale water control systems may work under certain conditions. 
SSDWRDSP has demonstrated that, in general, the best WMOs should have the following 
characteristics: (i) subprojects offering direct and tangible benefits, (ii) good and strong 
leadership, and (iii) support from proactive implementing agency and project staff. It was 
also noted that the WMCAs with good income-generating activities were better positioned 
to conduct O&M activities, although we have already recognized the fine balance that exists 
between income generation activities and attention to core responsibilities. All the above 
factors identified, moreover, will be applicable to any institutional structure expected to 
operate in this context, and are not peculiar to WMOs. 
 
From the iterative approach of SSDWRDSP and the ‘one-size fits all’ approach of BWDB 
emerges the fundamental importance of treating each WMCA on its own merits, avoiding 
generalized solutions. This includes assessing what maintenance the WMOs are capable of 
doing and what is beyond their financial and technical capability. This will help define more 
practically, the continued investments required from the government for a specific scheme. 
More fundamentally however, there appears to be an urgent need to recognize that there is 
no logical reason why WMOs in the Bangladesh polder context should succeed any more 
than any alternative institutional mechanism. As is the case in much of South and Southeast 
Asia, WMOs in Bangladesh do not represent a natural evolution of institutions out of the 
local context. They are imposed from outside, and as Mukherji et al. (2010) state, can often 
have no relationship with the ground realities in which they are expected to operate. In 
most cases, they represent a panacea articulated in the imaginations of actors (mainly 
donors) far removed from local realities. As Mukherji et al. (2010) conclude based on a 
review of 108 case studies, IMT/PIM is in fact far from a panacea to all problems and there is 
no magic formula for crafting successful WUAs. In fact, they found that farmers were often 
unwilling to take over management of water infrastructure (mainly irrigation systems), but 
did not have a choice about whether or not they were interested in IMT. These paradoxes 
manifest themselves through overall poor performance of schemes after transfer and in the 
difficulty in convincing farmers and irrigation bureaucracy alike about the virtues of 
managing public irrigation schemes on behalf of the government. This, they argue, requires 
us to re-assess our assumptions and focus on what the water users perceive as their 
interests, and the differentiation between and amongst various water users. This literature 
review is meant to be an expression of this line of argument in its intention to form a basis 
for seeking a deeper grasp of the details involved in making sound water resources 
management possible in the specific polders in which this project intends to work. 
 
Another outstanding factor underpinning the experiences with WMOs in Bangladesh is the 
nature of the implementing institutions and their ability to respond to changing 
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developmental paradigms, as was the case with the emergence of notions of poverty 
reduction, participation, integrated water resources management and decentralization on 
the world stage through the 1990s in particular. The literature clearly demonstrates the 
strong implications for WMOs of the implementing institution’s orientation and capacities. 
Here too, the contrast in approaches between BWDB’s rigidity in the face of change and 
LGED’s willingness to re-structure itself to suit changing needs has been instructive. In 
addition to the discussion of these features in the prior section, LGED’s strategy of building 
on prior work through several phases of SSDWRDSP spanning well over a decade must be 
highlighted as a particular advantage when seeking to manage a dynamic resource within a 
heterogeneous and complex context. These cycles of project phases have allowed for 
periods of stock taking, learning and adjustments, and the opportunity to work continuously 
in the same locations provides the conditions for adaptive management.  
 
The importance of decentralization and the strengthening of local organizations and 
collaboration between them also emerges as a critical contextual condition given that 
WMOs need to be better linked to the horizontal and vertical decision making processes. 
Water management is closely linked to all aspects of rural livelihoods systems and many 
formal and informal organizations are already in place that in one way or the other deal with 
water management. It however is also the case that decentralization will not in itself resolve 
local level resource conflicts given the susceptibility of local organizations to influence by 
dominant groups. Consequently, water management is subject to the same power structure 
as the rest of rural society, and competing demands on water resources for different uses in 
fact continue to intensify.  
 
These dynamic processes of conflict over and co-operation around water resource scarcities, 
and their social and institutional expressions, are a dominant feature of life in rural 
Bangladesh. Some commenters believe they remain poorly-understood and little 
researched, and have to date been largely ignored at project and policy levels. This failure to 
understand and build upon these processes is seen as one of the principle reasons why past 
attempts at participatory development in the water sector have had so few successes. The 
review of literature for this report also supports this view that many of the socio-economic 
and political issues especially at local scale have not been appreciated. Almost all reports 
reviewed (numbering approximately 70) for this report present an assessment of WMOs 
confined to the traditional criteria surrounding operation and maintenance and related 
aspects such as collection of fees. This approach reflects water management from the 
limited technical perspective rather than the more expansive lenses of a) how WMOs have 
facilitated the resolution or management of local level conflicts over access to water, and b) 
how water as a resource contributes to local development overall and the narrowing of the 
gap between the rich and the poor. Despite references to power dynamics at community 
scale, no in-depth analysis of these dynamics was forthcoming, and consequently, there 
appears to exist a gap with respect to the role of heterogeneity as a core theme in the 
assessment of the participatory process that is to be embodied by the WMOs. It is moreover 
proposed that a more in-depth understanding of these dynamics will shed practical light on 
the nature of the policy, legal and institutional reforms that will also be needed to facilitate 
institutions like WMOs reach beyond their traditional roles. It may be argued that the 
SSDWRDSP experiences provide part of the foundation for doing this in its willingness to 
expand and explore the boundaries of its WMCAs’ mandate. It is also suggested that there 
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still needs to be a shift or expansion in the vision on the part of government with respect to 
the role and contributions of local stakeholder should play not merely in the water sector, 
but in the overall development effort, if these institutions are to become meaningful 
investments in the eyes of these stakeholders. The issue of water management and poverty 
reduction in the polders however require us to question the value of the WMOs themselves. 
Thus, the question is not limited to how to improve WMO performance, but rather what 
institutional structures and processes are most suited to support an integrated approach to 
water management in the current local contexts specific to each polder. This review does 
not find any specific reason to continue assuming that WMOs are the only option or that 
they offer the best option simply owing to their existence. The evidence available in fact 
suggests the opposite. 
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Appendix I: Summary of key Water Sector Policies 
The focus of water sector policies in Bangladesh have been dominated by either combating 
natural disasters like floods and cyclones or attaining self-sufficiency in food production 
through dry season irrigation (GoB 2006, Chowdhury and Rasul 2011).  Major initiatives like 
the 1964 Master Plan and the 1989 Flood Action Plan focused on flood management while 
the 1972 Land and Water Resources Sector Study and the National Water Plan Phases I 
(1987) and II (1991) emphasized agriculture production. What was common to these and 
other initiatives was the lack of a comprehensive approach to water as an inherent part of 
an ecosystem having multiple and competing uses. Since there was no framework for 
integrated water resources planning, the schemes executed under those plans did not bear 
any mark of an integrated approach, with agriculture remaining the dominant component 
(GoB 2006). 
 
The influence of floods and agriculture 
As explained by Chadwick and Datta (2003), the real beginning of water sector planning was 
marked by the completion in 1964 of a 20-year Water Master Plan which envisaged a 
strategy of massive flood control and drainage to be followed by irrigation in a later phase. 
However, in actual implementation of the plan, much emphasis was put on the construction 
of embankments and polders over much of the country. Although the activities carried out 
under the Master Plan generated results, later evaluations found a rapid rate of decline in 
performance, especially in terms of operation and maintenance, of much of this 
infrastructure. The orientation of all water sector development to this time was almost 
exclusively aimed at achieving the goal of increasing agricultural production to achieve 
national self-sufficiency. This bias towards agriculture meant that solutions tended to be in 
the form of flood control drainage and irrigation (FCDI) projects. In reality, emphasis was 
placed on flood control mainly. Then, as is still the case today, the majority of staff at the 
East Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (now the Bangladesh Water 
Development Board (BWDB)) were civil engineers and the organization was inclined to seek 
structural engineering solutions at the expense of all alternatives.  
 
The country’s most devastating flood events of 1987 and 1988 put immense pressure on so-
called structural flood intervention, necessitating further investment in flood defense works. 
The World Bank coordinated the activities of the donors to prepare a Flood Action Plan 
(FAP). A feature of FAP (1989–1994) was the construction of still more embankments and 
polders along the major rivers. However, after massive failures of the FAP and the huge 
economic losses sustained during the 1997 and 1998 floods, it became clear that structural 
interventions alone were not enough and a shift of emphasis from structural intervention to 
integrated planning with non-structural flood-control measures was required. This led to an 
emerging new consensus on the need for, firstly, an integrated water resources 
management approach which considers all aspects of water resources and uses, and, 
secondly, on the need for approaches which are built around the social, and not the 
technical, dimensions of water resources management. This consensus is reflected in both 
the new policy framework of the Bangladesh Government (reflected in key policy changes 
such as the 1995 Strategy Paper on Water and Flood Management; Water Policy of 1999 
and the Guidelines for Participatory Water Management (GPWM) in 1994 (revised in 2000)).  
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Flooding has also been a major driver of agriculture policy. Water resources development 
and management initiatives in Bangladesh are strongly driven by the need for sufficient 
food grain production for the country’s teeming population, and must be achieved in the 
context of perennial flooding. The monsoon rainfall is paramount for crop production and 
without it agricultural production would almost certainly stagnate. However, at the same 
time, its gigantic power of destruction usually creates floods of various magnitudes and 
extent (Sudip et al. 2011). 
 
National Water Policy, 1999 
The stated goal of NWP is “to ensure progress towards fulfilling national goals of economic 
development, poverty alleviation, food security, public health and safety, a decent standard 
of living for the people and protection of the natural environment". The NWP declares 
clearly the intention of the Government to pursue a policy of Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) and further pledges to take all necessary measures to manage the 
water resources of the country in a comprehensive, integrated, equitable and 
environmentally sustainable manner. Thus it provides a comprehensive policy framework 
for dealing with such issues as river basin planning, water rights and allocation, delineation 
of public and private domains, water supply and sanitation, preservation of the natural 
environment and the developmental concerns of fisheries, navigation and agriculture. It also 
provides guidance on its disposition towards water as an economic good, water pricing, and 
fuller participation by stakeholders, decentralized management and delivery structures. The 
Policy also formulates views on regulations, incentives, public investment plans and 
environmental protection and on the inter-linkages among them. Finally, the Policy 
enunciates the basic principles for reforming the water sector institutions, and specifically 
focuses on the participation by concerned stakeholders at the service delivery level. This 
concern is evident from the directive that the participation of all project affected persons, 
individually and collectively, is to be ensured in the planning, design, implementation and 
operation and maintenance of publicly funded surface water resources development plans 
and projects. 
 
It is the intention of the Government that the policy will be given effect through a National 
Water Code which will outline the specific provisions of the water policy required to 
facilitate implementation. This code is likely to revise and consolidate the laws governing 
ownership, development, appropriation, utilization, conservation and protection of water 
resources. 
 
National Water Management Plan  
In 2001, the government introduced a National Water Management Plan, prepared by 
WARPO. The plan’s aim is to implement NWPo directives and decentralize water sector 
management. It provides a framework within which line agencies and other organizations 
are expected to coordinate planning and implementation of their activities. 
 
The Plan is intended to identify the needs and priorities for water resources management, 
the institutional structure through which these resources should be managed and the 
process through which both institutional reform and priority interventions can be realized. If 
successful, the NWMP will represent a radical break with the past and provide a framework 
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for the more effective management of these resources in the future. However, as already 
mentioned, the jury is still out on whether it will achieve this.  
 
The intention is that it will provide advice on the actions required to successfully implement 
the policies outlined in the NWPo. WARPO is responsible for the development of the 
NWMP, which is to outline the strategy, management programme and principal works up to 
2025. The main elements of the NWMP, among others, include the multi-use approach to 
water (not just flood protection but also irrigation, drinking water and other uses) and an  
emphasis on 'soft' approaches instead of just hard engineering approaches. 
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Appendix II: Summary of key Water Sector Laws 
Embankment and Drainage Act, 1952 
This Act provides for the construction, maintenance, removal, management and control of 
embankments and water-courses in order to improve the drainage and protection from 
floods, erosion or other damage by water. 
 
Bangladesh Irrigation Water Rate Ordinance, 1983 
The Ordinance provides for water charges applied to tenants or owners of land benefiting 
from water supplies on behalf of the Government, the BWDB and the Bangladesh 
Agricultural Development Corporation. Charges are determined by the government. In view 
of the high exposure to flood damage, the Ordinance provides for the partial or total tax 
remission in case of poor harvest or none at all. 
 
Ground Water Management Ordinance, 1985 
This Ordinance uses tube well licensing (granted by the Thana Parishad) to regulate 
groundwater abstraction. The Thana Parishad is required to conduct an inquiry before 
issuing a license. The criteria for the inquiry include: soil condition, distance to other well 
and benefiting area. The license may be granted if the Thana Parishad is satisfied that the 
installation of a tube well is beneficial, will not have an adverse effect upon the surrounding 
area and is otherwise feasible. 
 
Water Resource Act of 1992 
This Act established the Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO), details of which 
are in Annex III. 
 
Bangladesh Water Development Board Act (2000) 
This Act clarified the functions of BWDB as including: waterworks for flood control, drought 
prevention, soil conservation, etc.; works for the improvement of water flows to assist 
fisheries, navigation, wildlife development, etc.; river bank protection; construction and 
maintenance of coastal embankment; prevention of salinity intrusion and desertification; 
harvesting of water for irrigation, environmental preservation, and supply of drinking water. 
It also called for the transfer of BWDB projects covering up to 1,000 ha to local authorities; 
the gradual transfer of the management of existing projects between 1,000 ha and 5,000 ha 
to beneficiary organizations, and the management of schemes over 5,000 ha by a joint 
committee comprising beneficiaries, BWDB, and other water-related agencies. 
 
Draft National Water Act 
This is meant to be a comprehensive Act to govern the use and management of water 
resources and to provide legal basis to operationalize National Water Policy while 
integrating the existing laws and regulations relevant to the sector and providing new 
framework for such issues as water appropriation and licensing, and water right 
administration. Under the proposed Water Act, unless otherwise provided by law, the state 
owns all water resources in Bangladesh, including surface water, groundwater, and sea 
water. Water may be legally appropriated for customary uses, but users must hold a water 
use-right. Use rights are naturally awarded to individuals for the collection of water for 
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domestic uses, for bathing, and for navigating small watercraft. For other purposes, use 
rights must be acquired through a general authorization or license.  
 
Water rights are tied to land ownership, and individuals and communities can hold water 
rights based on their rights to the land. State-owned closed water bodies of less than 3 acres 
in size are to be subject to common-property principles, and poor people living in the area 
will be allowed to access the water for their domestic use. In addition, private individuals 
may have and control small household ponds.  
 
Cooperative Societies Ordinance 
Originally legislated in 1984, this Ordinance was revised in 2001 to better accommodate 
water user groups. Key changes are (i) individuals can now belong to more than one 
cooperative, (ii) registered water users cooperatives can exact an irrigation service charge 
from both members and non-members provided that all benefit from the irrigation services, 
and (iii) the Department of Cooperatives cannot take direct action against a water users 
group without the concurrence of the sponsoring agency. Together, these changes 
effectively removed earlier barriers to establishing and nurturing water users groups. Many 
of the WMOs are currently registered under this Ordinance. 
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Appendix III: Summary of key Water Sector Institutions 
A number of agencies have interests in water, interests that are sometimes complementary 
but more often competitive.  As many as 35 central government institutions, affiliated with 
13 different ministries, have responsibilities and activities relevant to the water sector. Key 
development project implementation agencies of water management investments are the 
Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB), responsible for projects exceeding 1000 ha 
in size, and the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) responsible for projects 
smaller than this. 
 
To recast the NWP within the appropriate intersectoral focus, the MPO was restructured as 
the Water Resources Planning Organisation (WARPO) in 1991 with the mandate to "evolve 
national policies and strategies for utilization and conservation of water by all" (GoB, 1999, 
p15). (Chadwick and Datta 2003) 
 
National Water Resources Council (NWRC).  
In 1983 the NWRC was established as an inter-ministerial body. It is the water sector apex 
body chaired by Prime Minister to formulate water policy and ensuring inter-agency 
coordination. NWRC consists of representatives from all water-related ministries and is 
supported by an Executive Committee to ensure prompt action on routine matters. The 
NWRC led the NWP development process. It is also responsible for the continued 
development of water resources institutions and for providing policy directives for co-
ordination across sectors. However, it is the responsibility of WARPO to determine the 
means by which the broad policy aims in the NWP are to be implemented and the Policy 
itself implies the framework within which this is to be achieved is through the NWMP. 
 
The Executive Committee of NWRC (ECNWRC) 
To support the NWRC, a 15 member Executive Committee of the NWRC (ECNWRC), headed 
by the Minister of Water Resources was constituted in 1997 by an order of the Government. 
In carrying out its responsibilities to the ECNWRC, WARPO is to provide a high caliber 
Secretariat and to ensure that routine matters are addressed without delay. It will also 
address the issues requiring the attention of the full council and will ensure that issues are 
properly presented, recorded and executed. 
 
Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) 
The Ministry of Water Resources is responsible for flood management, irrigation, drainage 
control, erosion protection, land reclamation, integrated management of coastal polders, 
river flow augmentation, water sharing from transboundary rivers and wetland conservation 
through participation of local people and coordinated programs with all the ministries 
dependent on water resources. Major public organizations under the Ministry of Water 
Resources are WARPO, BWDB and River Research Institute (RRI). MoWR is entrusted under 
the NWPo with formulating a framework for institutional reforms to guide water related 
activities. 
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Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO)  
WARPO was set up under Water Resource Act of 1992 under the Ministry of Water 
Resources as the multi-disciplinary planning organization at the national level. Its mandate 
was further elaborated in National Water Policy of 1999 according to whicg, WARPO has 
two broad responsibilities: (a) to work as the exclusive government institution for macro 
level water resources planning and (b) to work as the Executive Secretariat of the WRC and 
its Executive Committee. WARPO has become the exclusive government institution for 
macro-level planning.  
 
The preparation and updating of both the National Water Policy and the National Water 
Management Plan is a key responsibility of WARPO. It is also mandated to advise other 
water-related organizations in the development, use and conservation of water, and provide 
specialized multi-disciplinary and cross-sectional training to concerned functionaries. While 
WARPO is responsible for water sector macro planning, it is also expected to promote 
appropriate linkages between macro and micro level planning and provide guidelines for the 
efficient use of the country’s water resources by all users and in all uses. 
 
Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) 
The character of the BWDB was paralleled by the dominant approach of the government to 
water resources management in Bangladesh until very recently. Major investments in the 
water sector are made by the Ministry of Water through the BWDB which carries 
responsibility for the planning and execution of over 500 projects, ranging from flood 
control, drainage and irrigation to coastal protection and erosion control. As WARPO is 
responsible for national and regional level plans BWDB is supposed to develop projects 
fulfilling the requirements of their plans. It was and still is predominantly an engineering, 
construction-oriented agency. It has a large professional staff, almost all of whom are 
engineers by training, and a centralized structure which is suited to large scale construction-
type activities but far less appropriate for any management functions which require 
significant devolution of responsibilities and the capacity to respond to local conditions and 
events (Chadwick and Datta 2003). Although the focus of water management has shifted 
towards joint management, user directed activities, transparency and efficient management 
techniques over the years, the organizational culture has been slow to change (ADB 2003A).  
 
Over time, its original mandate has become inappropriate, as economic, social and 
demographic changes and the consequent increasing competition for water use added new 
and complex dimensions to its original basic tasks. With the formulation of National Water 
Policy, there have been attempts at institutional reform to achieve decentralized and 
devolved management with greater role for local government, community groups and the 
private sector. A major institutional step forward since the formulation of national water 
policy has been the revision of BWDB’s mandate, as embodied in the new Act (ADB 2003b). 
In an attempt to adapt, BWDB has begun to partner with NGOs for such activities as 
mobilisation of beneficiary’s group formation, and resettlement (Hussain 2004). 
 
Under NWP, BWDB will no longer be the only key player, the overall policy, macro planning 
and strategy functions was taken out of BWDB (and given to WARPO), and even for 
implementation of water projects local government and water users themselves was to 
assume increasingly important roles (ADB 2003a). 
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Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) 
LGED grew from a rural works programme started in the early 1960s. Located within the 
Local Government Division and is responsible for planning and executing rural works. With 
offices in every district and Upazila, it provides technical guidance and personnel support to 
Upazila Parishads in implementing rural WSS projects financed by Upazilas or government, 
and also seconds executive engineers to larger municipalities. LGED is also involved with 
stakeholder-driven small-scale surface water management projects with command areas 
less than 1,000 ha. It places a heavy emphasis on local participation, with representation on 
Upazila Co-ordination Committees. In regard to water sector projects, LGED draws its 
mandate from Upazila Parishad Act (24 of 1998) Second Schedule, Clause 23 items 4, 11 and 
17 which makes LGED responsible for ensuring the best possible use of surface water, for 
adoption and implementation of minor irrigation project in line with government directions. 
The current program of activities of the LGED has been developed on the basis of policies 
approved for the sub-sector under the Fifth five-year Plan. The objectives of the policy 
include: Reduction of poverty in the rural areas; Productive employment generation in the 
rural areas and Self-employment creation for the rural poor. LGED works with local 
communities in the development of rural infrastructure and, more recently with promoting 
community participation at all stages of project cycles as it implements various projects. 
 
As the local government system is reestablished and starts functioning, LGED’s role will 
eventually have to change. When all the different tires of the local government come into 
effect, the local development activities will be determined by the local councils and not 
through central mechanism of LGED as it happens now. LGED’s role will be to assist the local 
government councils in all development projects (ADB 2003a). 
 
Bangladesh Agriculture Development Corporation (BADC) 
Operating under the Ministry of Agriculture, it took the lead in minor irrigation by 
introducing low-lift pumps and deep tube-wells through cooperatives. In the late 1980s, 
BADC withdrew its irrigation services, leaving all irrigation equipment to farmers’ groups or 
individuals (Hussain 2004). 
 
A summary of organizations and their roles in the water sector is given in the table below. 
 
Organization  Current functions Major issues/problems 
National Water 
Council  
 
Approving national water policies Too few meetings and 
inadequate service support 
from the Water Ministry 
Planning 
Commission 
Establishing multisector investment 
priorities; recommending allocation 
of resources 
Too much attention to 
routine and process matters; 
too little attention to 
strategic direction 
Water Resource 
Planning 
Organization 
(WARPO) 
Water policy formulation; National 
water planning; monitoring; 
formulation of water legislation and 
regulations; intersectoral 
coordination of water plans; central 
Limited physical resources 
and staff capacity to perform 
required 
functions 
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Organization  Current functions Major issues/problems 
data system 
Geographical 
Information System 
Unit 
Collecting hydrologic, topographic, 
soil, and flood regime data 
 
Support for continued 
existence after Flood Action 
Plan 
Bangladesh Water 
Development Board 
(BWDB) 
Physical modeling; river-training 
studies 
 
Physical modeling for, among 
others, surface and ground 
water; inadequate funding 
Institute of Water 
Modeling (under 
BWDB) 
Mathematical river, flood 
management, irrigation system, 
national and regional, and 
environmental modeling; and survey 
and data collection; developing a 
national hydrological data base 
Support for continued 
existence after Flood Action 
Plan 
Flood Forecasting 
and 
Warning Center 
(under BWDB) 
Collecting and disseminating 
information 
 
Lacks proper coordination 
and linkage with the national 
Data collection and monitory 
Units 
Local Government 
Engineering 
Department 
(LGED) 
Planning, designing, and 
implementing rural infrastructure 
development projects; Thana/Union 
drainage and embankment 
planning, irrigation planning, land 
and water use planning; small-scale 
water schemes, canal digging 
programs, town protection schemes 
Little or no coordination with 
Bangladesh Water 
Development 
Board and other agencies; 
inadequate authority for 
enforcing 
water regulations 
Roads and 
Highways 
Department (RHD) 
Rural and urban water supply and 
sanitation 
 
Little or no coordination with 
BWDB and other agencies; 
inadequate enforcement of 
water regulations 
Water Supply and 
Sewerage 
Authorities 
(WASA) 
Construction and upkeep of potable 
water supply, sewerage and storm 
drainage in major cities. 
 
Lack of autonomy from 
Government control and 
financial dependency 
Department of 
Agriculture 
Extension (DAE) 
Disseminating information on 
agricultural technology, including 
water and land use 
 
Little or no coordination with 
Bangladesh Water 
Development Board and 
other agencies 
Bangladesh 
Agriculture 
Development 
Corporation (BADC) 
Operating low-lift pumps and 
tubewells; harnessing hill streams; 
controlling salinity; distributing 
water for irrigation 
 
Little or no coordination with 
water sector agencies; 
inadequate responsibility for 
enforcement of water 
regulations 
Bangladesh Inland 
Water Transport 
Authority 
River conservancy work, including 
river training for navigational and 
meteorological information, 
including river charts; hydrographic 
Inadequate coordination 
with water sector agencies; 
inadequate authority for 
enforcement of water 
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Organization  Current functions Major issues/problems 
survey; programming for dredging 
and reviving dead or dying water 
bodies; developing, maintaining, and 
operating inland river ports; 
developing rural water transport 
regulations 
Department of 
Environment 
Monitoring pollution in rivers and 
underground and drinking water; 
working with other water agencies 
to develop environmental protection 
measures; collecting and analyzing 
environmental data; monitoring and 
analyzing surface water for 
pesticides and heavy metals; 
analyzing wastewater samples for 
different agencies; helping agencies 
prepare environmental impact 
assessments 
Insufficient coordination 
with other water sector 
agencies; inadequate 
enforcement of water 
regulations 
Source: Water Resource Management in Bangladesh: Steps Towards a New National Water 
Plan, World Bank, March 1998. 
 
 
Service Delivery Institutions 
The Public Health Department is responsible for rural and water supply. Construction and 
upkeep of potable water supply, sewerage and storm drainage are done by Water Supply 
and Sewerage Authorities (WASAs) in two largest cities. WASAs do not have autonomy from 
government control and financial dependency. 
 
The activities of a number of other public sector agencies have an impact on or are 
supplementary to the agencies directly involved in the water resource development 
activities. The main agencies are the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE), 
Department of Fisheries (DOF), Forest Department (FD), Department of Environment (DOE), 
Department of co-operatives (DOC), Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB), 
Department of Livestock services (DLS) and Ministry of Land (MOL) etc. The role of these 
agencies in relation to water sector interventions is to deliver services in their respective 
fields of activity within the participatory framework set out in these guidelines. These may 
include assisting WMOs, i.e. WMGs, WMAs and WMFs, in identifying problems and 
providing potential solutions. The concerned implementing agency for the water resource 
development project will take the initiative to ensure necessary co-ordination and co-
operation with the above public sector agencies (Hussain 2004). 
 
DAE of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Cooperatives Division of the Local Government 
and Rural Development and Cooperatives are also implementing programmes focused on 
agricultural development. The DAE is mainly concerned with the promotion of new crop 
production technologies and improved and balanced input use; while the Cooperatives 
Division distributes credit to farmers’ associations formed within the framework of its 
mandate, which are known as Krishak Samabaya Samity (KSS), for agricultural and rural 
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development. The involvement of BADC is highly concentrated in seed distribution. RKUB 
distributes agricultural credit according to its own programmes. It has both short-term and 
long-term credit programmes in the G-K and PIRDP areas as also elsewhere in Bangladesh. It 
does not provide any special credit for shallow tubewells and other agricultural equipment. 
Clearly, support for agricultural development in the area is dependent on public sector 
agencies such as BWDB, DAE, and RAKUB. 
 
Cooperatives Division of the Local Government and Rural Development and Cooperatives 
The Cooperatives Division distributes credit to farmers’ associations formed within the 
framework of its mandate, which are known as Krishak Samabaya Samity (KSS), for 
agricultural and rural development. 
 
Department of Cooperatives is the most important partner in the development and 
continued sustainability of the WMO. Technically, its principal role, so far as these relate to 
WMO affairs, is regulatory in nature. It is charged with the responsibilities of timely 
registration of the cooperative associations and closely monitoring their activities through 
inspection of their activities and regular audit of their accounts. Other responsibilities 
include education and training of the sponsoring agency officials, members of the 
cooperative associations, advisory and consultancy services and assistance in arranging 
finances for development work by the associations. Timely discharge of all these functions is 
essential for the smooth operations of the WMOs. The DOC is one of the oldest 
Departments of the Government. However, there has not been any recent effort at its 
institutional development suiting to the challenges of the times. Like most other 
departments of the Government, the DOC also follows a standard staffing pattern, each 
Thana having two Cooperative Inspectors. However, deployment of field staff of the DOC 
should be based on the volume of active case load. The main reason hampering the DOC 
officials in discharging their duties more efficiently and at regular intervals were lack of 
logistics (GoB 2006).  
Although BWDB is the main organization with responsibilities in polder management, Union 
Council and Upazila Executive Office are also involved in maintenance work indirectly by 
taking canal excavating projects for creating jobs for the poor that have consequences on 
the water availability for cultivation (Alamgir 2010). 
 
Unfortunately, there is hardly any institutional base for local level planning, although the 
district and thana level offices of the central government agencies make some efforts at 
involving the local people in various stages of the scheme cycle. Except for the Union 
Parishad, the Thana and Zila Parishads have had no elected representation for long. These 
parishads are run on an adhoc basis by members of the bureaucracy (GoB 2006). 
 
Department of Cooperatives 
The Department of Cooperatives is the principal government organization responsible for 
the promotion, development, and registration of cooperative societies in Bangladesh. It 
works directly under the supervision and control of the Rural Development and Cooperative 
Division of the Ministry of Local Government. Parliament passed the Cooperative Societies 
Act in 2001 
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Local Institutions 
Local government has historically had a marginal role in the process of implementing water  
management investments, though it is forecast that this role will become more dominant in 
accordance with the directives of the National Water Policy.  Local Governments (Parishads) 
are to be principal agents for coordinating the participation of project-affected persons in 
planning, design, implementation, and operation and maintenance of publicly funded 
surface water development plans and projects (ADB 2003a). According to the NWPo, water 
management and allocation will be devolved to the local administrative level although this 
‘local administrative level’ is not defined. Four tiers of local government institutions are 
being established in Bangladesh: district, sub-district, union and village. Only one level of 
institution (union) is found to be active. As per the assessment in 2000, the District, Sub-
District and Village Acts exist, but elections to the councils at these levels have not been 
held.   
 
District Level Inter-sector Project Evaluation Committee (DLIPEC) 
Inter-agency coordination of water resource interventions at the local level occurs through 
local level through the District Level Inter-Agency Project Evaluation Committee (DLIAPEC) 
meetings. Staff from all relevant line agencies at the district are invited to participate in 
these meetings. In some cases, the water users organizations that have been established to 
manage water management investments have served to resolve local level disputes (ADB 
2008a). 
 
The DLIPEC was established by the Planning Ministry in 1999, in anticipation of inter-
sectoral conflicts between LGED and BWDB, both of which are entrusted to construct FCDI 
schemes up to 1000 ha, but the BWDB is responsible for all other schemes. The directive 
establishes a conflict resolution formula as follows: 
 
 Committees are constituted by the lead agency of the proposed project 
comprising a chairman, plus eight members including representatives from the 
District Administration, Department of Agricultural Extension(DAE), Local 
Government and Engineering Department (LGED), BWDB etc. 
 There are no representatives of the intended beneficiaries or of the concerned 
Local Government Institutions (LGIs) on the Committee. 
 The committee is empowered to prepare and submit PCPs. However, this is 
unlikely to happen in the near future. 
 If the Committee cannot reach a consensus on any project proposal, the matter 
would be referred to the BWDB Zonal Chief Engineer for resolution. 
 As a last resort, there is provision for a Central Co-ordination Cell to take the final 
decision. The Cell comprises seven members, including the Director General 
WARPO as the Chairman. 
 
Union Councils 
It is through local government i.e. Union Councils that the applications for construction of 
shrimp farm, for leasing in public water bodies or public land, for installation of a 
government funded pond sand filter  are verified. Leasing out the water bodies affects the 
availability and accessibility to water for both shrimp and rice cultivation. Union Council is 
